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The Appeal of the Underdog: Definition of the Construct and Implications for the Self
Nadav Goldschmied
ABSTRACT
From politics to sports to business, people are quick to categorize those at a
considerable competitive disadvantage as “underdogs.” Moreover, there is ample support
that most unattached observers do not hesitate to align themselves with underdogs, a
phenomenon termed “the underdog effect.” While most dictionary definitions state that
underdogs are “especially expected to lose,” the present investigation argues that people
often attribute optimistic qualities to underdogs and the exceeding of expectations. A
series of studies was conducted to examine the lay-person definition of what an underdog
means, as well as what motivations may play a role in the underdog effect. Study 1
investigated people’s spontaneous definitions of underdogs by exploring the semantic
network of the underdog construct through the use of the discrete associations method.
Study 2 explored the hypothesized looming success component of being an underdog by
asking participants to evaluate future success of underdogs vs. disadvantaged entities.
Study 3 utilized the false recognition paradigm to explore schematic memory of success
associated with the underdog construct, while the last study assessed whether people do
truly support those at a competitive disadvantage or merely root against the favorite, as
well as explored the possible role of the self in the underdog effect. Support for the
looming success of the underdog was found in the first two studies while the last study
demonstrated that strong self-identification with the underdog was highly correlated with
vi

support for it. Overall, the results of the current study suggest that people in American
society believe that underdogs are unique exemplars which are expected to do
significantly better than the initial expectations.

vii

Introduction
The Appeal of the Underdog
History is filled with enduring stories of rivalries between entities with noticeable
disparities of power or prestige, ranging from the paragon biblical story of David and
Goliath, through mythological Troy facing the almighty Greeks, to modern day
geopolitical examples pitting the USA as the lone superpower against much less powerful
rivals. Sometimes the lopsided struggle involves groups (for example, the USA hockey
team versus the mighty Russians in the “miracle on ice”), while at other times the rivalry
is between individuals (for example, Truman versus Dewey’s famous come from behind
victory of the presidency in 1948).
When such disparities of power or expectations for success exist, one side is often
labeled as an “underdog” (while its opposing party is termed a favorite, frontrunner, or
top dog). Underdogs are present throughout many human endeavors, ranging from
territorial disputes between tribes or states, to such domains as politics, sports, or the
business world in which competition is hailed as the source of economic growth.
Underdogs are often depicted as heroes, such as Rocky Balboa in the movie “Rocky” or a
horse named Seabiscuit who won the Kentucky Derby despite insurmountable odds.
The term underdog first surfaced in the 19th century. The word originated from
dog fighting, a common practice in those days, in which the losing dog was declared the
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“under dog” because it would usually submit, rolling over on its back, allowing the
stronger dog to tower over him. The weaker dog was literally under the stronger one.
One should note that being an underdog, based on the present day definition, exists for
the most part at the point in time before an outcome is determined.
The Merriam-Webster dictionary lists two definitions of an underdog: (1) a loser
or predicted loser in a struggle or contest; and (2) a victim of injustice or persecution
(Merriam Webster, 1994). Note that the second characterization raises the issue of
justice in determining who qualifies to be labeled as an underdog.
The present dissertation outlines four studies that were designed to explore how
people understand the underdog concept, as well as to examine possible motivations for
underdog support. The specific goals of this project were threefold: First, it aimed to
clarify the meaning of the underdog concept. Specifically, it is proposed that the lay
person’s definition of the underdog differed from the dictionary definition. Primarily, it
is hypothesized that, due to repeated exposure to selected exemplars of triumphant
underdogs depicted in movies, literature, politics, and sport, individuals facing the
underdog-top dog situation tend to assume the underdog’s looming success while
discounting objectively lower base rate odds for its success. Secondly, this dissertation
attempted to tease apart whether, or under what conditions, underdogs are supported
versus top dogs are rooted against – a phenomenon known as schadenfreude. It was
hypothesized that the relative status of an entity, and particularly its deviation from the
average, dictates people’s attitudes toward it. Thus, when scarcity of resources (in
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comparison to the average) is made salient, people might be drawn to sympathize with
underdogs; conversely, when abundance of resources (in comparison to the average) is
made salient, people will tend to root against top dogs. To test this hypothesis,
attentional focus was measured by testing memory for details of events associated with
the competing entities. Thirdly, a final aim of this project was to explore the implications
of underdog support for the self. It was hypothesized that underdogs are supported in
part because their success gives people hope and implies that outcomes (particularly
negative outcomes) are not fixed or predetermined.
In the context of this investigation, underdog support was examined only in
individuals who neither have prior affiliation with any of the competing entities (be it the
underdog or the top dog), nor possess detailed or specific knowledge about the competing
entities prior to the experimental encounter with them. Otherwise, if any prior affiliation
or attachment does exist, the question becomes of one of fan-ship, and although the
underdog support is not expected to override the fan’s affiliation, it is beyond the scope
of the present work to examine this assertion. Additionally, the current investigation is
based on the assumption that there is a direct, zero sum competition between the
underdog and the favorite: when one prevails the other loses and vice versa. Lastly, a
resolution of the competition is in near sight and is conclusive. The outcome can be the
final score of a sports game, adjudication by a court, a winning bid for a business tender,
or a win in a political race.

3

Past Research on Underdogs
Despite the ubiquity of underdogs, research examining people’s reactions to them
has been scant. On the surface, based on social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978), one might
predict that unaffiliated observers, who in essence get to choose sides, would align
themselves with the favorite, as its chances to prevail are higher. The theory asserts that
group membership creates in-group self-categorization and enhancement in ways that
favor the in-group at the expense of the out-group. The “minimal group” studies of
Turner and Tajfel (1986) demonstrated that the mere act of individuals categorizing
themselves as group members was sufficient to lead them to display in-group favoritism.
After being categorized by group membership, individuals seek to achieve positive selfesteem by positively differentiating their in-group from a comparison out-group on some
valued dimension. Thus, if the only information about a group or an entity available for
third party observers is expectations for success and one assumes that success is a
cherished attribute, then the unattached observers should support the favorite (i.e., the one
with the history and likelihood of success), rather than the “underdog.”
However, contrary to the intuitive notion that non-affiliated observers should
support the stronger side, there is some limited evidence indicating that individuals tend
to support underdogs rather than dominant entities. For instance, Frazier and Snyder
(1991) demonstrated that students exposed to short scenarios describing a competition
between a hypothetical, heavily favored team and a lesser counterpart in a seven-game
playoff series (with no other information available) showed a marked favoritism (88.1%)
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towards the underdog. After the participants had made their judgment, they were told
that the heavily favored team lost the first three consecutive games and thus was on the
brink of elimination from the series. Faced with this new scenario, in which the roles
have been inversed, about half of the participants (49 out of the 99 people who favored
the original underdog) changed their allegiances and preferred that the original underdog
(i.e., the less capable team in the original scenario) lose the next game, a possible
testament to the transient nature of who qualifies as an underdog. Moreover, when
presented with a third and last scenario in which the two teams were tied at three games,
each going to the last deciding match in the series, 37 out of 44 participants changed their
allegiances once again and expressed their hope for a win for the original underdog,
demonstrating once again how fickle the underdog attribution process is.
Vandello, Goldschmied and Richards (in press) capitalized on the 2004 Olympics
in an attempt to create a more naturalistic environment to assess the robustness of the
underdog support phenomenon. Specifically, the participants were provided with five
countries’ all-time Olympic medal totals, which were assumed to be good indicators of
these countries’ chances of winning in the upcoming Summer Olympics. Participants
were asked to imagine two of the countries engaged in an upcoming swimming contest.
The results revealed that, in accordance with the relative rankings of the teams, those
countries with fewer medals received significantly stronger support from the unaffiliated
individuals. This backing of the underdog was especially apparent for the country in the
middle of the pack (Belgium, ranked number 3): when this country faced a top-ranked
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team (Sweden) participants wished for it (Belgium) to win, but when it faced the lowest
ranked team the support shifted to its rival.
Ceci and Kain (1982) used the presidential race of 1980 between Carter and
Reagan to demonstrate the underdog effect in politics. The participants were presented
with fake polls indicating either of the candidates holding a dominant lead. Among the
participants who were exposed to a Carter lead, 44% declared themselves in Reagan’s
camp, versus roughly 30% in Carter’s, while 25% remained undecided. On the other
hand, among those who were told that Reagan was holding a substantial lead in the polls,
only 21% declared themselves in his favor while approximately 53% aligned themselves
with Carter. Moreover, the authors divided the participants into those who had an initial
inclination towards one of the candidates before the polls were introduced (i.e.,
“partisans”) and those who had no inclination at all (i.e., the “undecided”). Even among
the partisans, 22% of those belonging to the Reagan camp and 30% of the Carter camp
shifted their support following the manipulation (i.e., when presented with the polls
indicating dominance of their candidate). Among the originally-undecided group, the
shift was even more overwhelming, as 66% changed their minds to oppose the dominant
frontrunner.
In a more recent study, Vandello et al. (in press) explored the underdog
phenomenon in the geopolitical realm. Unlike in previous research in the political
domain (cf., Ceci & Kain, 1982), underdog status was defined as a country’s relative size
on a map. Specifically, the participants were exposed to either a map in which Israel was
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drawn next to the Palestinian Authority so that the former was greater in size relative to
the latter, or a map in which Israel was shown as a part of the larger Middle-East region
where Israel appeared much smaller relative to its Arab neighbors. All participants were
furnished with the same abbreviated history of the Arab-Israeli conflict (with a balanced
representation of each side of the conflict) and then were asked about their support for the
two sides (as well as their prior knowledge of the history of the clash, in order to rule out
any prior affiliation with one of the sides). As in previous studies, participants’ support
varied as a function of the “underdog” status, as expressed by the size on the map,
extending their support in either condition to the smaller size party.

The Looming Success Component
The sound support extended to the underdog demonstrated in the reviewed studies
is puzzling in light of the Webster’s dictionary definition, which characterizes the
underdog as a loser (Merriam Webster, 1994). In turn, Webster’s definition for a loser is:
(1) one that loses especially consistently; (2) one who is incompetent or unable to
succeed; and (3) something doomed to fail or disappoint (Merriam Webster, 1994). The
dictionary states that the idiom sprang from student slang in the mid 1950’s and came to
signify a “hapless person”. It has obvious negative connotations for the individual it
labels. Why, then, do people overwhelmingly support an entity that, in essence, has a
past track record of a loser?
Furthermore, this anomaly goes a step further. Sympathy for underdogs may
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extend beyond rooting for them as an observer to actively seeking to label oneself as
such. It is not uncommon to find two competitors vying for the underdog label to shy
away from any semblance of superiority prior to the competition itself. In both sports
and politics, not infrequently, both competing parties seem reluctant to hold the label of
frontrunner, and are willing or even happy to embrace the label of underdog. Quotes like
“Former Vermont Gov. Howard Dean and Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts lead in the
latest tracking polls in New Hampshire, but both are calling themselves underdogs as
they retool their campaigns in a changed political landscape” (Mercurio, 2004) are plenty.
This suggests that there is an intuitive appreciation that others prefer and sympathize with
underdogs.
It is possible that political leaders and others recognize that the dictionary
definition of the underdog, which denotes pending failure based on unfavorable chances
to prevail prior to the competition, is incomplete and that the seemingly irrational
behavior of the politicians quoted above is not irrational at all. Particularly memorable or
salient examples from the media and popular arts (e.g., literature and cinema), which
often focus on unlikely victorious underdogs, may create a widespread belief that future
underdogs can win. Hence, lay people’s instinctive definition of underdogs might be
much different and more optimistic than those stated in the dictionary. Specifically, it is
proposed that, in addition to accepting the basic disadvantage prior to the upcoming
contest as part of the underdog definition, people also assume that if the underdog term is
mentioned to describe a competition, there is an additional component of looming
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success, which becomes an integral part of the construct. It is important to emphasize
that this dual-component definition of the construct does not necessarily transpire at the
conscious, deliberate level of processing, but rather at the intuitive, implicit, belowawareness level of the construct perception. This introduces the need to study people’s
reactions to underdogs in domains such as memory and discrete free associations, in
order to tap into implicit, intuitive definition of underdogs, which may further illuminate
underdog support.

Justice-Based Motivations for Supporting Underdogs
Given the evidence that people tend to support underdogs, an obvious question is
why. One possibility is that competitions of unequal status make justice concerns salient.
In other words, people may root for underdogs to succeed as a way to restore equality,
which may be perceived as a more just state of affairs under exposure to extreme power
disparities.
In order to explore the justice motivation, Vandello et al. (in press) manipulated
expectations to win an athletic competition independently of relative resource
disadvantage. Specifically, participants were presented with four vignettes describing
two sports teams about to face each other. The four vignettes differed in either: a)
expectations for success (based on performance history), b) resources (based on the
teams’ payrolls), c) both expectations and resources such that the team with the low
expectations also had the lesser payroll, or d) expectations and resources such that the
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team with the low expectations had the larger payroll. In the first three conditions, the
clearly disadvantaged team (the one with a losing record, with smaller payroll, or both)
was easily defined as an underdog and was overwhelmingly supported by the
participants. In the last condition, however, participants expressed support towards the
high expectations team with fewer resources, but they had some misgivings about
labeling it the underdog (only about 55% of them did so). It is noteworthy that, among
all the underdog studies reviewed above (e.g., Ceci & Kain, 1982; Frazier & Snyder,
1991; Vandello et al., in press), this fourth condition was the only scenario in which a
party with high expectations received significant support, suggesting that the definition of
underdogs based solely on expectations is incomplete.
Based on this unique incident, it can be deduced that unattached observers who
are exposed to very basic information about struggling underdogs assume that they are
resource disadvantaged in some respect. This, presumably, primes their core justice
concerns, which, in turn, drives the support for the weaker entity locked in a direct
competition against a much stronger and assumed to be privileged opponent. While this
is a plausible argument, it should be noted that justice as a motivation for underdogs
support has gained only indirect support in the study by Vandello et al. (in press).
Regrettably, the participants in that study were not queried directly about any justice
concerns that might have been elicited (and even if they were, their self-report would
likely be confounded by social desirability).
Thus, an underdog scenario could be thought of as a heuristic, or a short-cut for
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information processing. That is, even when expectations for future success is the only
piece of information available to the unattached observers, they still assume that those
expectations are based on some material short handedness. Accordingly, the findings by
Vandello et al. (in press) indicate that in the one condition in which it was implied that
the underdog squandered its resources (i.e., the 4th condition), the support for the
underdog was diminished. This decision-making process almost automatically calls for
justice or fairness considerations.
Specifically, conditions of scarcity of resources call for assessment of resource
allocation based on the justice norm of deservingness (Skitka & Tetlock, 1992). In the
studies described above (Ceci & Kain, 1982; Frazier & Snyder, 1991; Vandello et al., in
press), unattached observers were asked to make decisions about their support based on
the parties’ expectations to win. In each of the studied scenarios, only one competitor
could triumph. It may be reasonable to assume, therefore, that when faced with a
situation of remarkably uneven history of success and failure, the unattached observer is
called to examine his or her inner concepts of justice and the “distribution of fate” in the
world. Deutsch (1985) labeled such a scenario “relative deprivation” – a violation of a
perceived entitlement, which serves as a driving force behind the enhanced sense of
injustice. In other words, third party observers may implicitly introduce the sense of
some universal, global fairness to their assessment of the situation. They may ask
themselves – most likely implicitly than explicitly – whether the distribution of rewards
is fair or unfair in relation to both entities, as well as in relation to general principles of
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justice expressed in the societal norms.
Skitka and Tetlock’s (1992) contingency model of resource distribution proposes
that when individuals face a situation where they need to extend their support to one of
the two sides, they turn to attributional analysis. The question, then, is: are the
competitors vying for their support personally responsible for their predicament or not?
The attributional analysis appears to account for the findings by Vandello et al. (in press),
such that, once made aware that the underdog – as defined by expectations to win or lose
– had more resources compared to the top dog, participants diminish their support toward
the underdog, while also struggling to clearly label the two entities as underdog or top
dog.
Thus, it appears that detached observers tend to assume a match between lack of
success and a state of relative resource deprivation and base their favoritism towards the
weaker side on the perception that this disparity is unfair. The support extended to the
underdog offers people the opportunity to symbolically rectify the unjust state of affairs
they perceive. It is possible that the direct competition scenario provides an element that
sharpens this notion and pushes the majority of people to align themselves with the
underdog.

Utilitarian-Based Motivations
Another competing explanation for the support that non-partisan observers extend
to the underdog may derive from a rather opposite motivation. Instead of seeking justice
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and trying to even the odds on a moral basis, third-party onlookers may be driven by
rather rational, self-promoting utilitarian motives. From this perspective, the choice of
sides for whom to root follows a cold, logical calculation (even if not explicit one) with
regards to which side would provide the biggest positive emotional payoff. This
calculation is determined by expectations for success and predicted emotional payoff in
case the success is achieved, as follows.
As the underdog concept is based on expectations, non-partisan observers have
little to lose by supporting the underdog. Underdogs are expected to lose (by definition)
and, thus, their loss carries little adverse emotional implications for their supporters,
whereas a win could carry immense favorable consequences by its mere unexpectedness.
On the other hand, if support is extended to the top dog, people stand merely to lose. Top
dogs are expected to win, but because of this expectedness their win bears smaller
positive emotional benefits (if any), while their loss, because of its unexpectedness, could
be devastating once they committed themselves. Underlying this logic is an emotional
cost-benefit analysis intended to determine one’s alignments with one of the competing
sides. Steve Spurrier, a former football coach at the University of Florida, was quoted
after many years of success: “I’d like to be the underdog again. ...Being an underdog is a
little bit more fun at times…It’s almost a disgrace every time we lose. It’s a relief when
we win instead of (the feeling) we got when we weren’t supposed to” (English, 2002).
The affective consequences of expected and unexpected outcomes is well
grounded in Decision Affect Theory (DAT; Shepperd & McNulty, 2002), which
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postulates that human beings feel displeasure when their outcomes fall short of the
counterfactual alternative and feel elated when their outcomes exceed the counterfactual
alternative. In situations with positive or negative outcomes, expectations determine the
counterfactual alternative. For example, Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, and Ritov (1997) found
that participants who took part in an experiment simulating a gambling sequence were
overjoyed following unexpected wins as compared to the expected ones and, by contrast,
were more disappointed after unexpected losses than after the expected ones. Hausch and
Ziemba (1995) demonstrated a similar pattern outside of the laboratory, in the realm of
horse racing, where bettors trying to maximize their profits still bet too frequently on
longshots, which are almost never a good wager. For example, longshot horses that win
only 1% of the time have 2% of the total money bet on them. Again, in accordance with
DAT principles, betting on extreme favorites (those with the odds between 20/1 and 10/1)
to win the race is considerably high, but those super-horses still do not garner as much
bets as they should (based on eventual winning results). Shepperd and McNulty also
found support for the DAT principles in another domain, in which expectations of high
versus low risk in a fictitious medical condition were manipulated. Once again,
expectations influenced the subsequent affect.
The intuitive logic of Decision Affect Theory can also be found in everyday
expressions like “don’t get your hopes too high” and “expect the worse and you will
never be disappointed.” It is, therefore, plausible that non-partisan observers adopt this
rationale to protect themselves emotionally. Note that this motivation does not require
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people to identify or sympathize with underdogs, nor does it require motives of justice to
be elicited. Yet, however convincing this utilitarian approach is, people tend to
overestimate self-interest as a motive for behavior (Miller & Ratner, 1998).

Underdog and the Implications for the Self
People differ in their beliefs about inequality, with some believing that outcomes
should be distributed more or less equally (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994)
but it seems that there is still a degree of self-interest involved in holding such beliefs, as
individuals rarely believe in justice, merely for the sake of justice. Specifically, those
who favor equity in society often do so because they are invested in the folk wisdom that
“hard work pays off.” Such a belief is adaptive because it suggests that one’s current
status is malleable and changeable, and that one will not always be stuck in an inferior
position. It is likely not the case, however, that all people define themselves as
underdogs and, thus, by supporting underdogs in fact support themselves, as suggested by
other researchers (Markus, McGuire, Allison, & Eylon, unpublished manuscript). This
all-inclusive assertion would be too far reaching. Instead, it is postulated that any
individual who functions in a social setting is bound to feel like an underdog (i.e., inferior
relative to others) at one time or another. This experience is a major source for the
inherent appeal of underdogs. It is likely that one roots for underdogs because, should
they succeed, their accomplishments are rendered more satisfying and gratifying by
virtue of the augmentation principle (Kelly, 1972) – that is, they have succeeded in spite
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of seemingly overwhelming obstacles. Thus, a victory by the underdog makes
individuals feel better about themselves by reinforcing their own belief that hard work in
the face of a disadvantage and adversity does indeed pay off. This notion received
indirect empirical support (Vandello et al., in press) when participants watching a
basketball game consistently perceived a team as exerting much more effort (than its
opposition) when it was believed to be an underdog. Thus, support for underdogs based
on these implications for the self may reflect a hybrid between two motivations described
above – the justice-based and the utilitarian motives – in that it is not purely self-interestbased (because the equity principle of justice serves as its foundation); neither is it
distinctly justice-based as it self-driven by the aspiration to improve one’s situation in the
future. This latter motif is in contrast to the short-lived utilitarian motivation of
maximizing emotional pay-offs based on mere expectations.

Overview of the Present Studies and Specific Predictions
A series of four experiments was conducted to explore the underdog phenomenon.
The first study sought to explore people’s spontaneous and unstructured definitions of
underdogs by exploring the semantic network of the underdog construct. Study 1 was,
thus, a concerted effort to use a systematic, reliable and controlled method of exploring
semantic associations to clarify the construct of the underdog and to explore the argument
that the schema of the construct might be different than the dictionary definition. The
second series of experiments (Studies 2-3) explored the hypothesized looming success
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component of being an underdog. Though underdogs do not typically prevail, it is argued
that through selective attention to those singular ones who eventually do, people tend to
inflate the chances of all future underdogs to beat the odds. Study 2 examined this
assertion in a straightforward manner by depicting underdogs in the arenas of sport,
business and politics and asking participants about their chances to prevail (winning a
game, a tender or an election respectively). In a between study design the same struggling
entities were labeled as either disadvantaged or underdogs. It was hypothesized that after
being exposed to the underdog label (but not the disadvantaged label), participants would
be more likely to inflate the chances of future success for this entity, relative to stated
odds.
Study 3 aimed to explore the relationship between the underdog concept and
winning, in accordance with the looming success theory described above. Specifically,
Study 3 provided participants with narratives about a competitively imbalanced women’s
softball match. I tested the hypothesis that people tend to attach an underdog label to
entities that are either competitively disadvantaged at the point prior to a competition or
are considered at a disadvantage prior to a competition but eventually win; but not to
those who are considered at a disadvantage prior to a competition and subsequently lose.
Utilizing the false recognition paradigm, it was hypothesized that in the first two
conditions (i.e., in a state prior to the competition or a scenario in which an originally
disadvantaged entity won the competition), the word underdog would be falsely
recognized more often than in the condition in which a lesser contender eventually lost.
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Lastly, Study 4 focused on the motivations behind underdog support. It was
predicted that sympathy for underdogs would drive underdog support when the
disadvantage of an entity was made salient; conversely, when an entity’s relative
advantage was made salient, support for the underdog would be driven more by
schadenfreude. To test this, Study 4 measured people’s attentional focus while watching
a sporting event. Specifically, after presenting participants with a short basketball clip of
two unknown teams, better memory for the underdog was predicted in the condition
where it had significantly fewer resources than the average (thus denoting true underdog
support), while better memory for the favorite was expected in the condition where it had
significantly more resources than the average (suggesting schadenfreude).
In addition, Study 4 investigated possible implications of the underdog for selfperceptions. Specifically, it was tested whether individuals’ support for underdogs was
based, at least partly, on the perception that if underdogs prevail, the world was perceived
as malleable (which by implication might mean that any person can better his or her
position in the world) on a range of issues not specifically connected to the competition at
hand. After watching the basketball clip and learning that the underdog either won or
lost, participants completed questionnaires measuring self-esteem and worldviews. It
was predicted that participants who initially supported the underdog and were exposed to
the underdog winning would report significantly higher levels of state self-esteem and
stronger worldviews that endorse mutability in general, above and beyond their reported
identification with the underdog.
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Study 1: The Semantic Network of the Underdog
As an initial investigation into the meaning of underdogs for laypersons, Study 1
was exploratory. This study attempted to generate a cognitive map of associations to the
underdog construct by employing the method of discrete free associations. Although the
underdog effect has been demonstrated to be robust and reliable (Ceci & Kain, 1982;
Frazier & Snyder, 1991; Vandello et al., in press), the construct’s meaning (i.e., what do
people denote when they think about underdogs) has yet to be adequately explored.
Although participants in studies by Vandello and colleagues have been asked this very
question, this effort was primarily intended as a manipulation check to verify that there
was an agreement with regard to which entity constituted the underdog. It is also safe to
assume that the participants’ perceptions of the construct were highly influenced by the
experimental vignette or other stimuli they had just been exposed to and not necessarily
reflected their true and unbiased interpretation of the concept. Moreover, a more
structured and reliable method to answer the question at hand (than an open-ended
format) is warranted. By adopting a more restrictive method used primarily in the
memory research domain, a better grasp of what underdogs mean to lay people can be
attained. Lastly, such an exploration is needed since many previous attempts to explore
the underdog support (e.g., Ceci & Kain, 1982; Frazier & Snyder, 1991) did not actually
employ the word underdog, but rather utilized designs in which an underdog scenario of
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disadvantage was created. Thus, the investigation into the meaning of the underdog
construct appears necessary.
This study utilized the method used by Nelson, McEvoy, and Schreiber (2004) in
their attempt to create a large normative database of free associates to many semantic
concepts. In their data collection, they asked participants to write the first word that
came to their mind that was meaningfully related to, or strongly associated with the cue
word. For example, if given ABILITY _________, the participants may have written
COMPETENCE on the blank next to it. This procedure is called a discrete association
task because each participant is asked to produce only a single associate to each word.
This laborious undertaking was first attempted by Jenkins and Palermo (1964), although
their effort was limited in scope. Free association data for meaning appeared to provide a
useful means for indexing pre-existing strength of relationship between words. It is
assumed that exposure to a familiar word implicitly activates (i.e., primes) words or
constructs with similar meaning. In order to shed light on the semantic meaning of
underdog there is a need to construct such an associative map.
Nelson et al. (2004) included all associates that were mentioned more than once
by the participants in the set size of the cued word. This effort was additionally
supplemented by exploring the relationship between the associate and the cue in reverse
order, such that once an associate was mentioned by more than one participant, it was
shown to another group of participants in the same manner that the cue was initially
introduced. This enabled assessing whether a reverse semantic linkage or resonance
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existed between the two words.
However tempting it is to infer the strength of the backward connection from the
forward one, one should be cautious. The correlation between the two across all the
samples (n = 63,619) in Nelson et al.’s studies was only moderate – r = .29 – and the
chances of assessing back strengths from the forward ones is not likely to succeed. In
addition, there may be associates that are linked directly to other associates but not
through the initial cue. When this is the case, connectivity is established. Thus, based on
the summation of all associations, resonance and connectivity information acquired from
worldly experience (Tulving, 1983), an associative map is created. This lexical structure
plays a vital role in any mental task involving familiar words. This role, in turn, is
complex and is probably different for different tasks, but the basic structure is assumed to
remain stable whenever meaning is sought. Most word linkage is presumably formed
through word experience in spoken conversation, reading and thinking. Discrete free
associations norms are assumed to provide a reliable index of semantic distance (Nelson
et al., 2004).
Based on the norms collected by Nelson et al. (2004), different words have
different set-sizes, with varying strength of the associative relationship, connectivity and
resonance. Links vary in strength, direction and directness (Nelson, McKinney, Gee, &
Janczura, 1998). In essence, every forward connection value between two words in the
map points to the probability that one word produces another under the free association
instruction and given a particular sample size.
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Why then use free associations to get to the meaning of the underdog construct?
First, using free association as a procedure for measuring strength of connections has a
long history as a reliable technique (Cramer, 1968; Deese, 1965; Jenkins & Palermo,
1964; Nelson & Schreiber, 1992). Second, compared to the method of rating pairs of
words for “relatedness”, free associates technique has a few major advantages. Ratings
cannot be used to determine either direction or source. A rating of high relatedness could
be given because there is a high A to B forward connection or because there is a high B
to A backward connection. This point is of importance for the underdog construct
exploration, as it was hypothesized that the word underdog would produce mostly
antonyms in forward linking. This would be the case because the underdog is forever
locked in a direct competition with its archrival, the top-dog. In addition, none of the
possible associates was expected to produce the word underdog when they served as cues
in the backward linking phase. These predictions were made due to the complexity of the
underdog construct, as it was hypothesized to be composed of at least two main
components: initial disadvantage and looming success, and, thus, no one associate was
expected to capture it wholly. An underdog is in many ways a story unfolding: it begins
with notable disadvantage, but also consists of possibly overcoming the odds (be it real or
moral in nature). Thus, this presumably dynamic nature of the underdog is hard to be
captured by one associate only. Consequently, the free associates method appears to be
well suited for exploring such complex construct.
On the other hand, its valuable contributions notwithstanding, the free associates
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method also suffers from several disadvantages. Primarily, it underestimates the strength
of very weak associates as participants are asked to come up with only one target word.
This limitation is not assumed to be of major concern given the goal at hand. The attempt
to get to the meaning or the various facets of being an underdog is an initial inquiry into
its major building blocks and, as such, the weak associates are not the focal point of the
investigation. Of note, Nelson and colleagues (2004) lamented the problematic
generalizability of the cognitive map across different geographic regions. For example,
differences in language between Florida and Great Britain proved to produce differences
in free associations.
As stated before, the free association procedure is not without faults nor is it the
only method to assess connection strengths. Continuous associations and co-occurrence
norms are both suitable alternatives but their interpretation is more complex and requires
a more comprehensive set of assumptions before the analysis can be started (e.g., how the
answers are classified, in what rank order they are treated, etc.). Yet, the central
advantage of the free associate approach is that the strength of association between
semantic concepts can be quantified: the probability that, given one word or concept (i.e.,
underdog), another will be produced (e.g., disadvantage or hero). These probabilities can
then be used to establish models of semantic memory operation behind the underdog
concept.
In sum, this free association method, which employs conditions of minimal
constraint, was chosen due to the complexity attributed to the underdog construct. In
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essence, the underdog concept is hypothesized to be composed of two separate
constructs. The first component: disadvantage, was studied partially in a previous
experiment by Vandello et al. (in press), in which participants agreed that a sport team
qualified as an underdog if its expectations to prevail in an upcoming competition were
low, or if it had lower resources than its competitor or both.
This investigation aimed to illuminate another aspect of the underdog construct the possibility for the “looming success.” It is hypothesized that the use of the term
underdog entails and/or triggers unrealistic expectations to do better than previously
predicted. In addition, given this hypothesized dual nature of the underdog construct, the
free associates procedure was expected to produce discrete associates that also signified
change from one state of affairs to an unpredicted one (e.g., words such as surprise, stun
or amaze may come to mind).

Method
Participants. One hundred thirty students (77 women, 47 men, 6 unidentified)
from University of South Florida and Palomar Community College (in San Diego,
California) participated in the underdog forward linking initial phase task. The average
age was 21.11 years. Fifteen (11%) reported that English was not their first language,
while two did not report their first language.
Procedure. The participants were presented with a short list containing six words
(see appendix A). The first word was always underdog to avoid any priming by other
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words. The other five words (i.e., doubt, feathers, tow, parking, electric) served as fillers
to mask the true purpose of the study. The decision to employ those specific words was
made because they had been used by Nelson et al. (2004) in their original normative
study, which allowed comparing the results of the present study with theirs. Participants
were asked to “to write in each blank the first word you think of that means the same
thing as or is strongly associated with the word printed on the page”.
Once the responses were tallied and classified, as detailed below, a reverse
process was administered: Each associate mentioned more than once was presented in a
similar fashion to another sample embedded with other distracters to minimize priming
effects (except for those associates that were included in the original free association
database by Nelson et al., in which case the existing database norms were used instead).
The responses were tallied and a semantic map of the construct was developed (see
following example for the word planet; Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Cognitive map (free discrete associates) of the word planet. Adopted from
Nelson et al. (2004).

Analytic Strategy. The responses were not simply counted as in a frequency count
(Kucera & Francis, 1967) but were classified by two designated experts if questions of
classification arose. First, cue set size (QSS) was computed by counting the number of
different responses given by two or more participants in the normative sample. Nelson et
al. (2004) found that some words have set sizes of 1.00 (e.g., left has only one associated
- right) while others have set sizes of 30 or more targets (e.g., farmer). Next, forward
strength (FSG) was computed by dividing the number of participants producing a
particular response by the number of participants serving in the total group norming the
word (i.e., proportion). Backward strength (BSG) was assessed next, whereupon the
underdog associates served as cues themselves, to produce associates/targets. BSG was
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calculated in the same manner as FSG. Additionally, indirect connections were explored.
Specifically, FSG and BSG represent measures of direct strength because one word
directly produces the other as an associate in free association. Indirect connections, on
the other hand, link between related words that occur through other words. Thus,
mediated strength (MSG) was calculated by cross-multiplying the individual links and
then summing the results across each link. Nelson et al. indicated that while some word
pairs have no such connections, others have as many as 17.

Results
Fourteen responses were excluded from the analysis as participants did not follow
the instructions (7 provided two associates rather than one, 2 were illegible and 5
returned the form blank), five of which were students who reported that English was not
their first language. The remaining 116 associates were analyzed.
Of those, 46 words were mentioned only once (i.e., by one participant each) and
thus were excluded from the cue set size. Two associates, undercat and topdog, were
mentioned twice each, but were excluded from further analyses as they were determined
to be a non-word or a two-word idiom, respectively. For each of them, one response was
given by a participant whose first language was not English.
According to the a priori determination that the responses would not just be
counted as a frequency count, some associates and their derivates were grouped together.
This procedure influenced only three associates: Lose and losers, each reported once,
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were coupled with loser; swinging and swings, each reported once, were added to swing;
and, finally, win, which was also mentioned once, was added to winner. As a result, the
QSS (Cue set size) of underdog, which included 66 answers was composed of 10
different associates, each mentioned more than once: loser, winner, cartoon, swing, hero,
weak, team, rookie, football, cat and favorite.
Next, forward strength (FSG) for each associate was computed (see Figure 2).
This was achieved through the division of the number of participants who produced a
particular response by the number of participants who served in the norming sample (i.e.,
proportion). The associate loser had the highest forward strength with a value of .19 (22
responses out of 116); winner and cartoon had a value of .08 each (10 responses out of
116). Swing had a forward strength of .04 (5 out of 116 responses), while hero, team,
cat, football and weak, all had a forward strength value of .03 (3 out of 116 total
answers). Lastly, rookie and favorite had a value of .02 (2 responses each out of 116).
Next, the backward strength (BSG) of each of the associates was explored in
order to find out whether any was linked back to the word underdog. All but rookie were
found to have been already normed by Nelson et al. (1998) and none were found to have
underdog as their associate. Eighty eight additional participants participated in the
norming of the word rookie using it as a cue. Again, the word underdog was not
mentioned as a target in response to rookie by any of the responders. The following
words were found to be rookie’s associates: baseball, new, beginner, amateur,
professional, sport, veteran, starter, player, boy, novice, year, and first.
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The connectivity of the cue, or the indirect relationship among associates and the
target was explored next. Mediated strength (MSG), sometimes called 2-step strength in
the memory literature, was calculated by cross multiplying the individual links and then
summing the results across each link. Because underdog was never mentioned as an
associate, the MSG was computed to have a value of 0.

Discussion
The hypothesis that using underdog as a cue in forward linking would elicit
associates, which describe both an initial inferior position and an element of looming
success was supported. The strongest associate was loser, consistent with the common
dictionary definitions of the underdog denoting one that loses especially consistently, one
who is incompetent or unable to succeed, doomed to fail or disappoint (Merriam
Webster, 1994). This associate represented the initial state of affairs by which the weaker
entity, ultimately termed the underdog, was determined to be in a marked disadvantage.
The associate with the next highest strength was the winner (while cartoon had a strength
value identical to winner, it was clearly elicited in reference to the comic-strip figure, and
thus it would not be discussed in the present context). Winner stands in sharp contrast to
loser (the two are indeed connected as associates of each other in Nelson et al.’s norms)
representing “one that wins especially through praiseworthy ability and hard work…one
that wins admiration” (Merriam Webster, 1994). The third strongest associated as
defined by the forward linking strength was swing. This associate appeared to be derived
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from regional jargon as in California when children push each other on swings they often
run under the person on the swing and call this an underdog swing.
The tension among the two opposing components, disadvantage, on the one hand,
and looming success, on the other, was also present in the second tier of weaker
associates. Specifically, it appeared that while weak and rookie signified disadvantage,
or being new, inexperienced and unfamiliar to a new social environment, hero might
have represented higher status and esteem.
In sum, the semantic structure that emerged in the forward linking phase provided
some support to the conflicting nature of the underdog and attested to its mutable nature,
in contrast with the fixed existing dictionary definitions. Also, as hypothesized, in the
backward linking phase (BSG), none of the mentioned associates traced back to
underdog. Arguably, this pattern of results also emerged because to the dual nature of
the underdog concept (i.e., disadvantage and looming success), as no one associate was
able to fully capture its shifting nature.
Though the proposed notion is that underdog is seen as an entity in flux, in
essence transforming itself from a loser to a winner, alternative interpretations of the
results need to be considered as well. As participants were not instructed specifically to
define the underdog in one word, but rather were asked to think of an associated word, it
is possible that individuals who were thinking of the underdog, came up with associates
with negative valance (i.e., loser, weak), while those who provided more positive
associates (i.e., winner, hero) were imagining its antagonist, the top dog, as the two are
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defined by their direct competition. While certainly plausible, this interpretation is less
convincing because, if true, one would expect many more participants to name the words
frontrunner or favorite as the associates, rather than providing the top dog’s qualities
such as winner or hero. In order to rule out this alternative interpretation, the looming
success qualities of the underdog were explored in a more direct manner, in Study 2.

Figure 2. Cognitive map (free discrete associates) of the word underdog. Numbers
denote forward strength (FSG).
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Study 2: The Looming Success of the Underdog – Direct Investigation
People are compelled to categorize in order to make sense of the world they live
in, so they can navigate it more efficiently (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Ross, 1977). In
making such decisions, people automatically assess the extent to which the entity in
question seems to fit one or another category. This process is referred to as the
representative heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972), which implies that a member of a
given category ought to resemble the category prototype or schema. This strategy is
effective as long as there is some validity to the prototype and the members of the
category cluster around the prototype. By employing this shortcut people limit their
cognitive expenditure and conserve important limited resources. However, people tend
to focus exclusively on a strong match between an entity and its categorical prototype and
by doing so tend to ignore other sources of information. Another possible valuable
source of information is base-rates of relative frequency (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973),
although the base-rate information also tends to be underweighted.
Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall, and Reed (1976) suggested that the base-rate
information is ignored in favor of individuating information because the former is
“remote, pallid and abstract” whereas the latter is “vivid, salient and concrete” (p. 24).
Underdogs, in essence, are defined by their base rate for future success. Whether defined
by betting percentages, experts’ opinions, or history of past failure/success, they all
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denote a markedly lower chance to prevail in a competition against a favorite. Hence,
when people are making decisions about future success and have no new information that
might potentially change the balance of power, they should unequivocally predict a
frontrunner success. However, in the present study it was hypothesized that when one’s
explicit underdog status was made salient, people would revert to the prototype. The
schema in this case, it is proposed, is not the aggregation of all encountered underdogs of
the past but only a very select few. The dividing line between which underdogs are and
are not remembered is based on their eventual success. This hypothesized mechanism is
propelled by the popular media that contributes to creating a collective identity around
underdogs who happened to triumph and such instances thus become underdog
exemplars. All the while, underdogs who lose are dime a dozen and thus are discounted
and do not enter the pool from which the representatives are sampled.
This process in essence demonstrates the availability heuristic whereupon people
often judge the likelihood of an event based on how readily pertinent examples come to
mind. Again, as in the case of the representative heuristic, typically those cognitive
shortcuts serve us right as there is often correspondence between likelihood and
availability. However, when it comes to underdogs (who are not supposed to win by
definition and odds) the availability memory bias is in stark contrast with the reality of
the likelihood of the underdog triumph.
Slovic, Fischoff and Lichtendtein (1982) demonstrated the power of the media in
perpetuating the availability heuristic. Their study is of great importance to the present
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investigation due to the similar mass communication mechanism proposed. Some news,
these researchers argued, receive more coverage because of their spectacular and
“telegenic” nature. For example, a tornado or a flood is much more likely to be shown on
the evening news than a lightning strike. Thus, participants are more likely to
overestimate the commonness of causes of death resulting from the former while
discounting the latter.
The availability and the representative heuristics sometimes work in tandem as
suggested in the present case. A judgment that two things belong together – underdogs
and winning – can make an instance in which they do indeed co-occur particularly
available. The joint effect of the two heuristics creates an illusory correlation between
two variables and the belief that they are indeed correlated when they are not. Infrequent
events are highly distinctive and, thus, when the overwhelming underdog surprises its
mighty favorite, this usually garners much interest in the media and captures people’s
attention and thoughts. Underdogs who fail need not be the focus of attention as they are
indistinct.
In Study 2, participants were exposed to either a struggling politician, business
entity, or a sports team about to contend with a formidable rival. They were consistently
described in the vignette as either “underdog” or “disadvantaged” entities. The
hypothesis of the looming success component was explored by asking participants
directly to evaluate the chances of the “underdog” or the “disadvantaged” side to prevail
in the competition against a 30% prediction of success as predicted by an expert in the
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vignette. The hypothesis was that when people read about “disadvantaged” entities, their
predictions would be somewhat favorable as there is some evidence that optimism
pervades people’s thinking about the future (Brickman, Coates, & Janoff-Bulman, 1978;
Markus & Nurios, 1986; Tiger, 1979). However, participants who read about struggling
entities as “underdogs” would have access the available “underdog heuristic”, and thus
their rating should surpass significantly not only the base rate reflected by the experts
opinion, but also the “optimistic” predictions of their counterparts who read about
“disadvantaged” entities.
A second prediction was related to the characterization of the entities as an
“underdog” and/or “at a disadvantage,” such that when the competing side was
specifically labeled in the text as either an underdog or disadvantaged, participants would
be likely to follow the characterization and endorse it as such. Overall, no differences in
the domains (i.e., politics, business and sport) were predicted, the use of three domains
was intended for generalizability of the findings.

Method
Participants. One hundred and seventy five participants completed
questionnaires in class sessions in exchange for class credits. Sixty students (40 females,
19 males and one who did not report gender) read a political scenario questionnaire in a
single class session (30 participants per each condition). Sixty students (48 females, 11
males and 1 who did not report gender) read a sports scenario in two separate class
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sessions (30 participants per each condition) and 55 students (27 females, 25 males and
three who did not report gender) read a business vignette in three separate class sessions
(28 read about underdogs while 27 about disadvantaged entities).
Procedure. Participants read one of six possible vignettes. Two vignettes
depicted entities with low probabilities for success in an upcoming sport match, two other
versions portrayed comparable conditions in the domain of politics, while the last two
described a similar business scenario (see Appendix B). The only difference between
vignettes in each field was that one included the word underdog in the text, while its
counterpart had the word underdog substituted with the word disadvantage and its
derivates. Participants were told that the vignette was an article downloaded from the
Internet and that the researchers were interested in people’s opinions about social
competitions. In each of the six conditions (sport/ politics/ business – underdog/
disadvantaged), the text stated that experts had predicted that the low probability entity
was 30% likely to overcome its opponent. Participants were asked to give their own
assessment of the probability of winning after reading the vignette (between 0-100%),
how much they supported it in comparison to the top-dog on a 5-point scale from not at
all to support fully (in the business vignette, the scale was modified to a scale of 1 to 9 for
each of the entities), and then to indicate whether they thought that the depicted entity
was disadvantaged (Yes/ Don’t know/ No) and whether they considered it as an underdog
(Yes/ Don’t know/ No) (see appendix B).
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Results
Looming Success. First, the main hypothesis of the looming success of the
underdog was explored. A two-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted
to explore the impact of labeling of the lesser entity and type of scenario on looming
success estimations. As predicted, there was a statistically significant main effect for
label, F (1, 169) = 5.5, p < .05, such that underdogs were predicted to do significantly
better (M = 44.31, SD = 19.3) than disadvantaged (M = 37.72, SD = 17.98). However,
the effect size was small (partial eta squared = .032). The main effect for scenario [F (2,
169) = 0.88, p > .05] and the interaction effect [F (2, 169) = 0.40, p > .05] did not reach
statistical significance.
In addition one-sample t-tests were conducted across the three domains to assess
if the looming success estimations were significantly different than the base-rate of
success as denoted by the experts’ opinions. This was the case for the underdog, t (87) =
6.95, p < .05, as well as for the disadvantaged, t (86)= 4.0, p < .05. The same analyses
were conducted separately for each domain. As shown in Figure 3, in politics, those who
were exposed to the underdog scenario thought that he would do significantly better (M =
42%, SD = 21.44) than the experts’ prediction of 30%, t (29) = 3.07, p < .05. The
prediction of success made by the participants who read about the disadvantaged
candidate was not significantly different (M = 34.83%, SD = 18.68) than that made by the
experts, t (29) = 1.42, p > .05. In business this pattern repeated itself, with those exposed
to the underdog vignette, predicting significantly more success (M = 46.96%, SD =
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18.02) than expert’s predictions, t (27) = 4.98, p < .001. In contrast, those exposed to the
disadvantaged entity (M = 37.48, SD = 19.88) were not different than the predictions
made by experts, t (26) = 1.96, p > .05. Lastly, in Sports, the underdog exposed group
thought that the weaker team would do significantly better (M = 44.13, SD = 18.54) than
the expert’s predictions, t (29) = 4.18, p < .001. The predictions of success made by the
participants who read about the disadvantaged team were also significantly more positive
(M = 40.83, SD = 15.36) than those of the experts, t (29) = 3.86, p < .001.

Figure 3. Projected success as a function of labeling and domain.
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Support. When participants were asked how much they supported the political
challenger on a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Fully support), overall, they were
somewhat supportive of the challenger (M = 3.15, SD = 1.01, with 3 being neutral).
However, participants were not more supportive of the underdog contender (M = 3.20,
SD = 1.00) as compared to those who read about a disadvantaged candidate (M = 3.10,
SD = 1.03), t (58) = .38, p > .05.
When participants were asked how much they supported the weaker team in the
sport domain on a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Fully support), they were somewhat
supportive of the challenger (M = 3.83, SD = .97). Those who were exposed to the
underdog contender (M = 3.73, SD = 1.2) did not differ in support from those who read
about a disadvantaged candidate (M = 3.93, SD = .65), t (58) = -.78, p > .05.
In the business scenario, a difference support score was computed (support for the
underdog minus support for the top-dog). There was no significant difference in the
computed difference when the entity was labeled as underdog (M = 0.11, SD = 2.63) and
when it was labeled as disadvantaged (M = -0.44, SD = 2.33), t (53) = -.82, p > .05.
Labeling. When participants read the underdog version across the three domains,
42 out of 88 (48%) thought that he was disadvantaged, while only 21 (24%) thought he
was not. The rest (25) were not sure. On the other hand, when asked about whether the
contender was an underdog, 65 out of 88, or 74%, thought that he qualified for the
definition, while 5 (6%) disagreed and 18 reported that they did not know (20%). Among
the other half who read the disadvantaged vignette, 44 out of 87 participants (51%)
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thought the lesser candidate was disadvantaged, while 23 disagreed (26%) and 20 (23%)
were not sure. When queried about his underdog status, 65 out of 87 (75%) agreed that
he was an underdog, while 13 (15%) objected and 9 (10%) did not know.

Discussion
The hypothesis that the use of the word underdog (as opposed to disadvantaged)
to describe a weaker entity would elicit a higher perceived likelihood of winning in an
upcoming competition than experts’ predictions was supported. Although this was
evident across all domains, in politics and business the disparity in assessments was
particularly strong. In sports, the difference was marginal. As hypothesized, participants
predicted doing better than the initial odds for both the disadvantaged and the underdog,
but estimates for the latter were greater than the former.
These results reinforced findings by other authors (e.g., Nisbett et al., 1976)
suggesting that people disregard base-rates and choose to come up with their own
estimations of future occurrences. However, these data suggest that participants decided
to do so especially in the case of a weaker entity labeled as an underdog.
These results also imply that the prototype of an underdog (formed through
memorable examples of inspirational, victorious underdogs in history, culture and sports)
is one that beats the odds. Participants presumably called on this prototype when asked
to estimate the likelihood of success of hypothetical underdogs in the present scenarios,
providing more optimistic estimates than the oddsmakers. It is important to note that
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people were not so optimistic as to believe that the underdog was a top-dog, as the
average estimate of success never reached the 50% mark in any of the vignettes.
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Study 3: The Looming Success of the Underdog – A Recognition Task
Bartlett (1932) was the first to make the distinction between reproductive and
reconstructive memory. The former is the rote production of material from memory,
whereas the latter refers to active processing of filling in missing elements while
attempting to recall. It is assumed that when people try to remember material rich in
meaning and detail (e.g., video footage, text, or prose), this effort is characterized by
reconstructive processes. Loftus and Palmer (1974) demonstrated the flaws of
reconstructive memory in their seminal work about the semantic integration of verbal
information into the visual memory. Their participants were more likely to falsely
remember seeing broken glass from an accident they watched a week ago when asked
whether the cars smashed into each other as opposed to collided, bumped or contacted.
This finding makes evident that the context (even if only defined by a word chosen to
describe the accident) is influencing reconstructive memory and the direction of the false
memories is in line with the expectations set forth by this contextual information.
Bransford and Franks (1971) tested the ideas of Bartlett by exposing their
participants to various sentences and then asking them whether they were novel or part of
the acquisition list. Results indicated that participants spontaneously integrated the
information expressed by a number of non-consecutively experienced but semantically
related sentences into holistic ideas, whereupon they encompassed more information than
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any acquisition sentence contained. In addition, participants felt most confident
“recognizing” sentences which expressed all the semantic relations characteristic of a
complete idea, in spite of the fact that such sentences expressed more information than
was communicated by any single sentence in the acquisition list. Thus, the notion of the
superiority of “idea acquisition and retention” over the individual sentence memory
received empirical support.
Thus, it appears that people are likely to remember the general ideas or the gist,
but not the exact words used to express these ideas (Sachs, 1967) or the minute details of
the gist. To fill in the gaps, people often infer or assume what happened. Possible
sources of such false memories are varied and can be driven by “indirect” or suggestive
remarks by others (Loftus & Palmer, 1974), direct suggestions (Loftus, 1979) or
inferences based on prior knowledge or schemas.
Schemas are structured representations of objects, events, individuals, social
roles, or any other type of concept which contains representations of both objects and
their predicates (relations between objects, attributes, etc.), where relations can be causal,
functional, thematic, social, etc. Established schemas represent the gist of several
instances of the same concept. Each time we encounter a new instance of a concept, it is
incorporated into the schema. Schemas determine what we remember as an instance of a
concept, for how long we remember it, and how available the information is. Schemas
also provide expectations, so that when we encounter a new instance of a concept, we do
not have to process all of the information, but can instead rely on the information already
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contained in the schema to do most of the work. Alternatively, when a new case, which
is missing an important component of the already well-established schema, is
encountered, we may fill the gap automatically.
Deese (1959) and later Roediger and McDermott (1995) masterfully demonstrated
these processes in their well-designed studies. Participants were asked to study lists of 12
words (e.g., white, dark, cat, charred, night, funeral, color, grief, blue, death, ink, bottom,
coal, brown, gray) while each list was composed of associates of one non-represented
target word (e.g., black). Upon immediate free recall tests, the non-presented targets
were falsely recalled 40% of the time and were later recognized with high confidence. In
a second phase, after increasing the number of sets of lists in the learning stage,
participants had a staggering false recall rate of 55% and on a later recognition tests
participants produced false alarms to these items at a rate similar to the hit rate. In
summary, these authors concluded that extra-list intrusions and the resulting false
memories creation under schema conditions and cognitive overload was a robust and
significant phenomenon to be reckoned with.
The false memory paradigm provided another opportunity to further explore the
underdog construct. As looming success is predicted to be an integral part of the
underdog construct, it was postulated that, when reading bogus articles about a competing
entity with low expectations for success (without mentioning the word underdog in the
text), participants would falsely remember seeing the word underdog under certain
circumstances. More specifically, this study tested whether participants were more likely
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to falsely remember seeing the word underdog in a story describing a disadvantaged team
that eventually won (vs. lost). It was hypothesized that: (1) participants in the Underdog
Before Competition and the Underdog Who Later Wins conditions would have higher
false recognition rates for the word underdog as compared to participants in the
Underdog Who Later Loses condition; (2) participants in the Underdog Before
Competition and the Underdog Who Later Wins conditions would have longer reaction
times on the underdog recognition trial as compared to those in the Underdog Who Later
Loses condition; (3) participants in the Underdog Before Competition and the Underdog
Who Later Wins conditions would be significantly less confident in their underdog false
recognition decision than those who were exposed to the Underdog Who Later Loses
condition (in other words, those who correctly remember not seeing the word underdog in
the Underdog Who Later Loses condition will be more confident than those in the other
two conditions, who will be more likely to falsely remember).

Method
Participants. One hundred students participated in the study. After close scrutiny
responses from eight participants were eliminated due to either not complying with or
failing to understand the directions. Of the remaining participants, the average age was
19.96 years (SD = 2.62). Seventy-four participants were females while 18 were males.
Procedure. Upon entering the lab, participants were told that the study explored
reading comprehension and spatial abilities. They were told by the research assistant that
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there were three phases to the experiment: (1) reading two text passages (see Appendix
C), (2) completing two pencil and paper maze tasks, each to be completed in 30 seconds,
and (3) answering a computer-based questionnaire about the texts they had read in the
first phase.
Participants were seated in front of a computer monitor and were assigned to read
one of three possible vignettes presented to them using Superlab stimulus presentation
software provided by Cedrus (www.cedrus.com). These vignettes (see Appendix C)
depicted either (1) a team with a slim likelihood of success about to face a mighty rival in
an important match, (2) a team with a slim likelihood of success that faces a mighty rival
in an important game and wins, or (3) a team with a slim likelihood of success that loses
an important game to a mighty rival. All other content was kept as identical as possible.
Thirty-two participants were exposed to the before competition vignette, twenty-nine
read about a surprise win of the weaker team, while thirty-one read a scenario about the
weaker team losing. None of the vignettes in the three conditions included the word
underdog. Participants were given as much time as they wanted to read the text.
Next, all participants read an additional text which served as a distracter (see
Appendix C) and were then administered two distracter maze tasks to be completed in 30
seconds each timed by the research assistant. All mazes were 8 x 8 inch rectangular
shaped. The distracter task was planned such that within the time allotted for the task
participants would be unable to solve the maze. The rationale in completing this phase
was that recognition memory is typically very strong and, thus, at least minimal time had
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to elapse in order for possible false memories to be created (Roediger & McDermott,
1995).
Following the maze distracter task, a brief practice was administered simulating
the upcoming recognition task. Specifically, participants were shown six graphic
symbols on the computer screen (all on one acquisition slide), after which they were
asked to recognize the symbols presented one at a time in a series of following slides
indicating whether they appeared or not in the original acquisition screen. Participants
were instructed to place their index fingers on either the ‘L’ key (denoting Yes) or the ‘A’
key (denoting No). In order to maintain uniformity, participants were asked to keep their
fingers on the respective keys at all times during the experiment. In addition, adhesive
stickers were placed on two adjacent keys to help participants remember their functions
(“Yes” on a key adjacent to the L key, “No” on a key adjacent to the A key).
Upon completion of the practice items, participants were asked to remember the
competition vignette they had read in the first phase of the experiment. Next, they were
presented with a series of words, each presented on a separate screen, and asked to
indicate whether they were novel or whether they had appeared in the original text. The
word underdog always appeared third on the list so that participants had received some
practice before encountering the underdog stimulus (while, on the other hand, keeping
priming by other stimuli to a minimum). In total, ten recognition items were presented in
this phase, five of which had appeared in the original vignette while five were novel.
Immediately following the recognition task, during which the participants’ recognition
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decision (Yes/ No) and reaction time were recorded, participants were also asked to rate
their confidence with regard to their recognition decision for the underdog. A 4-point
rating scale was used, with 4 = Very confident, 3 = Confident, 2 = Somewhat confident
and 1 = Not sure at all. In addition, as a manipulation check, participants were asked
who won the game.

Results
The first hypothesis was that participants would be more likely to falsely
remember reading the word underdog when the vignette: a) described a competition
where the outcome was not yet known, and b) after the weaker entity surprisingly won,
but not after the weaker entity lost. This hypothesis was not supported: There were no
differences in false recognition rates for the unknown outcome (Underdog Before)
condition (9 times out of 32, or 28%), after the weaker entity surprisingly won (Underdog
After Win; 4 times out of 29, or 14%), or after the weaker entity lost (Underdog After
Loss; 7 times out of 31, or 23%),

2

(2) = 1.87, p > .05.

The second hypothesis predicted that significantly more time would be required to
make the decision of whether the word underdog appeared in the outcome unknown
(Underdog Before) or surprising win (Underdog After Win) scenarios, as compared to the
after losing (Underdog After Loss) scenario. Examination of the distributions of the
reaction time values revealed both lack of normality and the existence of outliers. Five
extreme values were eliminated. Reaction times distributions are notoriously non-normal
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by their very nature, and the use of transformations has been a common analytical
approach in this field. Based on the shape of the distribution (positively skewed, with
most values concentrating at the lower end of distribution), a natural log transformation
was applied to the original reaction time measures (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The
changes in the skewness and kurtosis of the reaction time variable can be seen in Table 1.

Table 1.
Mean Scores and Normality indicators of the Reaction Time Variable, prior to and
following Log transformation

Reaction Time

M (SD)
1669.24 (906.65)

Reaction Timeln

3.15 (.15)

Skewness (SE)
2.41 (.25)
.18 (.26)

Kurtosis (SE)
7.64 (.50)
-.52 (.51)

A one-way between-group ANOVA using the log-transformed reaction time
values revealed that there was no main effect of type of scenario on the reaction time of
responding to the underdog item, F (2,84) = .54, p > .05 (see Figure 4).
The third hypothesis was that participants would be significantly more confident
when making the decision with regard to whether the word underdog appeared in the
Underdog After a Loss condition than in either Underdog Before a Competition or
Underdog After a Win scenarios. A one-way between-group ANOVA revealed no main
effect of the condition on the confidence level, F (2,89) = 2.34, p > .05 (see Figure 5).
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Figure 4. Mean reaction times (after Log transformations) in response to the Underdog
item, across 3 conditions.

Figure 5. Confidence ratings in for Underdog item recognition, across conditions.
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Finally, a manipulation check revealed that 10 participants (9.2%) were unsure of
the outcome of the game after answering the questions while 21 participants (23%) made
mistakes in stating the outcome. Analyses based on only those participants who were
correct in the manipulation check also revealed no support for any of the hypotheses.

Discussion
None of the proposed hypotheses was supported in this study. The false
recognition rates for the word underdog were not different across the conditions, that is,
when the outcome of the competition was unknown vs. after a surprise win by the weaker
team vs. after an expected loss by the weaker team. Similarly, no differences were
detected with regard to the reaction times when making the recognition decision for the
underdog item across the conditions. Thus, the proposed explanation of selective
attentiveness to the exemplars of successful underdogs failed to gain empirical support.
Several explanations exist as to why the study failed to support the proposed
underdog schema model, most of which are grounded in the limitations of the research
design. First of all, the manipulation check revealed that the percentage of participants
who were either not sure of the final outcome or answered incorrectly was high (32.2%).
The proposed mechanism of selective attention to winning underdog exemplars requires
that the participants remember the state or the result of the competition at the time when
they’re asked to define the nature of the event in retrospect. Thus, given that a third of
the sample failed to recall the correct result of the competition, it is possible that these
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participants did not generate the underdog schema at all and, subsequently, could not
have “falsely recognized” the word underdog as fitting into the missing template.
Secondly, the false recognition rates were overall quite low (22%). Given the
number of participants in the study (92) in three conditions, this rate might have been
insufficient in terms of the power to detect some effect. Participants were tested on their
memory only a few minutes after reading the vignettes. Recognition memory is typically
very robust in young, healthy people (Bayen, Phelps & Spaniol, 2000) and, thus, the
limited period of time between the learning and the testing phases was probably not long
enough to “induce” forgetting (necessary for substantial false recognition).
Another possible limitation is grounded in the mismatch between the proposed
phenomenon of looming success and strategy chosen to examine it in the current
experiment. While it was predicted that participants would err (i.e., recognize the word
underdog when it was never part of the vignette) in the scenarios where the outcome was
not known or after the weaker entity won, in reality, outside of the laboratory, the
misclassification actually occurs in situations whereupon lesser entities labeled as
underdogs in competition lose, and upon losing are forgotten as underdogs.
In sum, the first three studies attempted to clarify the underdog construct and to
explore the degree to which the dictionary definition matched the one used by people in
every-day context. This effort extended well beyond the linguistic realm and may
explain the underdog phenomenon based on heuristic-cognitive forces, which deem
looming success imminent. However, this is not the only mechanism at hand. In the next
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experiment, several manipulations were undertaken to explore the conditions of underdog
support vs. rooting against advantaged entities, as well as the possible place of the self in
why underdogs are supported.
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Study 4: Why Do We Support Underdogs?
Study 4A: The justice framework: Schadenfreude or Underdog support:
A Memory Test to Detect Attentional Focus
One possibility within the justice realm is that people do not so much root for the
underdog as much as they root against the more dominant entity. That is, what may
appear to be sympathy may instead be motivated more by pleasure in seeing a powerful
figure or team knocked off its pedestal, a phenomenon known as schadenfreude, or the
joy people take in others’ fall from grace. Elections for public office, for example, are by
definition a zero sum game: When one candidate wins a seat, its opponent invariably
loses it. It is possible that standing behind the underdog is just the mirror image of
aspiring for the strong side to lose. Maybe, because of social desirability, among other
possible reasons, nonpartisan observers publicly support the underdog while privately
aspire for the mighty to fall.
People are taught from infancy to think that good things that happen to others
should please them, while bad things that occur to others ought to be upsetting and
disturbing to the “moral” person. Sometimes, as we mature, the feeling of joy in the
misfortune of others creeps on us. Nietzsche (1887/ 1967) was the first to label the
concept of schadenfreude as an emotional reaction in the repertoire of feelings
experienced by human beings. He described it as the malicious pleasure that people take
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in the misfortune of others. Heider (1958) claimed that schadenfreude is counterproductive in the social setting because pleasure is a discordant reaction to another’s
downfall and hence it establishes an antagonistic relationship between the person who
experiences it and its target. Schadenfreude is opportunistic by nature, indirect and
passive. In other words, people who experience schadenfreude do not actively seek the
demise of other people or plan for it, but feel a burst of pleasure when encountering news
about a setback someone else suffered. Nietzsche added that seeing other people suffer
and experiencing schadenfreude, while not actively engaging in direct competition, is
socially less acceptable.
In their research on the 1980 presidential elections described before, Ceci and
Kain (1982) determined that polls did not create positive feelings towards the underdog
but, instead, created a negative reaction towards the candidate depicted as having a
dominant position. Thus, participants who were presented with one contender as leading
in an early stage, swayed away from him after the exposure to the polls (a ranking of 3.27
on a 7-point scale, compared to a 3.94 ranking in the control group). But when the same
group was later presented with another poll indicating a shift in the polls towards the
previous underdog, making him a dominant frontrunner, the participants shifted their
support once again back to the current underdog. This shift, however, was approximately
to the same rating held by the control group (3.9), suggesting that, “the seemingly large
shifts between the …inconsistent conditions were due to oppositional reactivity, not
necessarily underdog feelings. Subject shifting….did not surpass the initial position” and
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“dominance information did not evoke a positive move towards the underdog, merely a
movement away from whoever was currently being touted as dominant” (p. 240).
Smith and colleagues (1996) sought to explore the conditions under which
schadenfreude was most likely to occur. They presented participants with a short video
of a prospective medical student describing himself. The student was made to appear
either superior or average. An epilogue informed participants that the student was
recently caught stealing and thus would not be admitted to medical school. Participants
who watched the interview of the better-qualified student were more pleased upon
learning that this person suffered the setback than participants who watched his average
counterpart. These findings lent support to the schadenfreude phenomenon and
introduced envy as a state antecedent to the joy people take in others’ fall from grace.
Feather and Sherman (2002) tested the hypothesis that schadenfreude was more
closely related to resentment (defined as publicly expressed when the outcome is
undeserved) and a wish to correct a perceived injustice than to envy (which is privately
held and can occur without a sense of injustice or resentment). In their study, participants
were exposed to scenarios in which a student with a record of either high or average
achievement that followed high or low effort subsequently suffered failure under
conditions of either high or low personal control. The authors found that resentment
about the student’s prior achievement could be distinguished from envy, based on the
results of factor analysis of the data. Specifically, when participants deemed the result to
be unjustified (i.e., the student was not working hard but had high ability and grades) they
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expressed resentment towards him. Alternatively, when he was working hard and
succeeding, only envy was reported. Schadenfreude about the student’s subsequent
failure was predicted by resentment and not by envy; thus, deservingness was a key
antecedent to the manifestation of the schadenfreude sentiment.
Leach and colleagues demonstrated schadenfreude in the sports domain as it
manifested itself in inter-group relations (Leach, Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003).
Dutch soccer fans were asked about their feelings in regards to failure of the German
national team in the international arena. Based on pilot studies and history, the
researchers established that Germany was perceived by the Dutch as a mighty competitor
and, hence, predicted and subsequently found that the Dutch would be likely to
experience schadenfreude in the face of a German defeat by a third party (who
wouldn’t?). The authors argued that, although it is generally unacceptable to experience
malicious feelings such as dislike, the perceived importance of the issue at hand as well
as the inferiority threat (in this case, based on past history of German aggression and
relative size of the two nations) might have made schadenfreude more accessible and
acceptable.
So why would we expect nonpartisan observers, with no prior knowledge about
two competing entities, to develop schadenfreude after having read short vignettes
describing unequal competitors? A possible answer may lay in social comparison theory
(Festinger, 1954; Tesser, 1991; Wills, 1991). In this context, the envy or resentment is
literally defined by a comparison process. Following the finding that sympathy is more
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easily generated by misfortune happening to average, rather than superior, people,
Brigham and colleagues proposed that schadenfreude arises when people feel that a
misfortune befalling on others removes the negative, self-related effects of an invidious
comparison (Brigham, Kelso, Jackson, & Smith, 1997). Moreover, because of its distinct
features (i.e., opportunistic, indirect and passive, by definition), schadenfreude becomes a
welcomed guest by a nonpartisan observer who has little or no impact whatsoever on the
developing nature of the competition.
In the context of the present investigation, it was hypothesized that averageness,
or proximity to the mean in terms of resources availability, would set the motivational
frame of reference when watching an underdog-top dog competition. When a favorite
had a wealth of resources, which was substantially larger than the average, then
participants would be driven by schadenfreude and, as a result, would pay more attention
to events associated with the favorite. It was expected that they would do so while
professing underdog support and not rooting against the top-dog, when asked directly
about their support after watching a basketball game in which an underdog and a favorite
were depicted. This tendency was hypothesized to be at least partially driven by social
desirability concerns. On the other hand, when the underdog entity had substantially
lower resources than the average, while the favorite was just about average, the
attentional focus would likely to be placed on events associated with the underdog,
generating stronger or better memories for these events. This would not be expected to
change, however, the pattern of the participants’ responses, when directly asked about
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their support for the two entities; that is, the underdog support should be evident just like
in the previous condition. What was expected to be different was the memory (as
measured by either recall or recognition) for details associated with either of the
competing sides.
In sum, whatever basic process took precedent – schadenfreude or rooting for the
underdog – the observable outcome by non-partisan observers would be the same (i.e.,
rooting for the underdog). On the other hand, the possible underlying motivations behind
the support people extend to underdogs could be diverse.
The current study attempted to bypass social desirability concerns in
schadenfreude versus underdog support by testing memory for events in addition to just
self-reported support rates. It was predicted that reading about an underdog with
noticeably fewer than average resources would lead people to sympathize with the
underdog and thus focus their attention on the underdog (i.e., remember more details
associated with it) compared to the superior opponent. In contrast, reading about a top
dog, who has noticeably greater resources than average, would make its advantage
salient, thereby arousing motivations to wish for it to lose. These motivations or wishes
were not, however, expected to be demonstrated when directly queried about it, but were
predicted to shift the participants’ focus of attention to the top dog (i.e., remember more
details associated with it) relative to the underdog.
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Method
Participants. The sample included 161 participants (34 males and 127 females)
who received a class credit for their participation. Eighty-four participants were
Caucasian (52.2%), 20 were of Hispanic descent (12.4%), 19 were Asian-American
(11.8%), 12 participants identified themselves as African-American (7.5%), 12 labeled
themselves under the Other racial category and 14 did not report ethnicity. Sixty-four
reported that they watched basketball on TV very rarely (39.8%), 27 watched it rarely
(16.8%), 33 reported watching basketball sometimes (20.5%), 18 watched it often
(11.2%) and 5 (3.1%) watched it all the time. Thirty-nine participants (24.2%) did not
like basketball at all, 43 did not like it much (26.7%), 45 liked basketball somewhat
(28%), 13 liked it quite a bit (8.1%) and 9 (5.6%) liked the game very much. All but one
participant did not recognize any players from the clip, while one participant made a
wrong identification and thus was retained in the analysis.
Procedure. Participants watched an 8-minute video clip of a game between two
basketball teams (Tau Vitoria from Spain and Panathinaikos Athens from Greece)
competing for the European cup after reading a short vignette (Appendix D) describing
the history of the teams’ rivalry, with an underdog - top dog scenario (the team described
as the underdog was counterbalanced across participants). In addition to information
about popular perceptions of expectations for each teams’ success, as denoted by betting
money placed on each side, participants were also presented with the teams’ relative
financial resources in comparison to the league average. In one vignette, the underdog
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was significantly poorer than the league average while the top-dog was about average in
that regard. In the second vignette, the underdog was about average while the favorite
was significantly richer than the mean (counter-balanced, see Appendix D).
After reading the vignette about the game and watching the video clip,
participants were asked to recall certain events (e.g., how many points did each team
score; how many points did each team score during the clip; how many 3-point shots did
each team make; what was each team’s shooting percentage from the line; how many
times did each team dunk the ball; how many fouls did they commit; see Appendix D).
Participants were also asked to identify players from a line-up of photos and to identify to
which team they belonged. These recall measures served as an implicit index of where
participants focused their attention. Accuracy ratings were computed through the
standardized aggregation of all memory items.
Lastly, the participants were asked to report which team they supported and
which team was the underdog and top dog (see Appendix D for materials). Study 4a is,
thus, a 2 (top dog versus underdog, within subjects) by 2 (favorite resources outlier vs.
underdog resources outlier, between subjects) mixed model design.
Study 4a was a replication of a study attempted by Goldschmied (2005) with the
exception of two major changes. First, instead of asking participants about names of
players and jersey numbers, they were queried about events in the game, which could be
attributed to each team’s performance (i.e., number of dunks, three pointers made and
fouls committed). This seemed to be a more natural way viewers follow the game.

61

Secondly, in the previous attempt, schadenfreude was predicted based on the mere
mentioning of resources disparity. One condition included a competition between an
underdog and a favorite with no resources mentioned while a second one included the
same description with addition of a large payrolls disparity. This manipulation, however,
did not produce the predicted schadenfreude shift. In the present study, instead, it was
predicted that underdogs would be supported regardless of the type of vignette
participants were exposed to prior to watching the clip. More importantly, it was
predicted that participants would generally attend more closely to the outlier.

Results
First, to establish that neither team was favored even before it was assigned the
underdog label, 26 participants were asked to read a vignette describing that the teams
were of the same strength and caliber. In this condition, there was no significant
difference in participants’ wishing the Greek team to win the game (M = 6.23, SD = 2.23)
vs. the Spanish team winning the game (M = 5.77, SD = 2.73), t (25) = -.51, p > .05.
In addition, across the four underdog-top dog conditions, without taking into
account the underdog-top dog status of the teams, there was no preference in participants’
wishing a Spanish team to win (M = 5.93, SD = 2.5) vs. wishing a Greek team to win (M
= 5.41, SD = 2.59), t (160) = 1.39, p > .05.
Support. A mixed between-within subjects analysis of variance was conducted to
explore the impact of status (underdog & top-dog – within subjects variable) and outlier
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condition (underdog as a financial outlier vs. top-dog as a financial outlier – between
subjects variable) on support tendencies. There was a significant effect of status [Wilks’
Lambda = .77, F (1,133) = 40.75, p < .01, multivariate partial eta squared = .24.] such
that the underdog received overwhelmingly more support (M = 6.78, SD = 2.26) than the
top-dog (M = 4.44, SD = 2.32). The main effect for outlier condition [F (1, 133) = 1.30,
p > .05] and the interaction effect [F (1, 133) = .14, p > .05] did not reach statistical
significance.
Support tendencies were also explored as a dichotomous variable whereby
participants were asked which team they liked best on first impression. Across the four
conditions that depicted uneven competitions, the underdog was supported more than the
top dog. When the Greek team had a huge payroll relative to the mean, only 32% (10 of
31) of participants liked it relative to the Spanish underdog. When the Greek team had a
significantly smaller payroll than the average club, 64% (21 of 33) liked it more than its
opponent. When the Spanish team had a much larger payroll than average, it was liked
by only 33% (12 of 36). When the Spanish team had a smaller payroll than the average
club, it was supported by 80% (28 of 35) participants,

2

(3) = 22.21, p > .05. Thus,

across the four conditions, 70% of participants favored the underdog. In the even
condition, the participants were almost evenly split with 14 liking the team from Spain
and 12 preferring the team from Greece.
Similarly, when participants were asked for whom they would root, participants
were in favor of the underdog. When the Greek team had a huge payroll, 68% (21 of 31)
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participants rooted for the Spanish underdog. When the Greek side had significantly less
money than the average club, 52% (17 of 33) rooted for it over its opponent. When the
Spanish team had a larger payroll than average, 78% (28 of 36) rooted for the Greek
team. When the Spanish team had a smaller payroll than average, 71% (25 of 35) rooted
for it over the opposing team,

2

(3) = 5.82, p > .05. Thus, across the four conditions,

67% of participants rooted for the underdog, and in the even condition the participants
were almost evenly split with 12 rooting for the Spanish team while 14 preferred the
Greek side.
Memory. As part of the manipulation check to verify that the participants indeed
read the vignettes, they were asked to state the countries that the teams represented. One
hundred and forty, out of 161 (87%), reported correctly that Tau Vitoria originated from
Spain, while 146 out of 161 (90.7%) reported accurately that Panathinaikos Athens was a
Greek team. When queried about the colors of the uniforms, 158 out of 161 (98.1%)
participants correctly recalled that Vitoria was wearing a white uniform, while 159 out of
161 (98.9%) remembered that Panathinaikos was in green uniforms.
Before assessing the schadenfreude hypothesis, overall accuracy of memory was
explored. For the Spanish team, 114 out of 135 participants (84.4%) correctly recalled
that the team had 70 points when the clip they had watched ended. A one-sample t-test
demonstrated that participants recollection (M = 69.93) was not significantly different
than the actual score, t (134) = -.33, p > .05. For the Greek side, 102 participants out of
134 (75.6%) correctly recalled that the team had 69 points when the clip had ended. A
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one-sample t-test demonstrated that participants recollection (M = 68.69) was not
significantly different than the actual score, t (133) = -1.41, p > .05.
Also, an attempt was made to verify that participants recalled with clarity the
differences in budgets for the two clubs as well as the average payroll for teams in the
continent. In the condition in which the top-dog had a significantly higher-than-average
payroll ($107 million), the participants’ mean estimate of $107.88 was remarkably close
(Mode = 107, SD = 36.88) and not significantly different from the original number, t (63)
= .19, p > .05. As for the underdog’s budget in the same scenario ($22 million),
participants again recalled a budget quite correctly (M = 24.52, SD = 18.06), which was
not significantly different than the payroll in the article, t (63) = 1.12, p > .05. In the
underdog-as-lower-than-average scenario, participants’ memory of the top-dog budget
(M = 21.52, SD = 12) was not significantly different than the original budget ($22
million), t (65) = -.33, p > .05. Also, participants’ recall of the underdog’s budget (M =
10.15, SD = 27.05) was not significantly different than the actual figure ($5 million), t
(67) = 1.57, p > .05. Lastly, participants’ recall of the average budget was examined.
Across the two scenarios, participants’ memory after excluding one outlier (M = 25.13,
SD = 24.6) was not significantly different than the reported figure of $21 million, t (110)
= 1.77, p > .05. Thus, it was concluded that participants’ memory was very good in
regards to the information they read in the vignette.
Following, the first hypothesis of the study was assessed, which postulated that
memory was propelled alternatively by either underdog support (improved memory for
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the underdog) or schadenfreude (improved memory for the top-dog) and that the
changing focus was derived by deviation from the average. Each of the memory
categories was analyzed separately. First, each observation was compared to the real
score in the clip and a difference score was computed. In addition, the absolute values of
these difference scores were also created. The analysis of the differences in memory
between teams whose budget was significantly different than the average (an underdog
with a $5 million in one scenario and a top-dog with a budget of $107 million in the
second scenario) to those whose payroll was not markedly different from the average (a
top-dog and an underdog with $22 millions payroll) was conducted for both difference
scores (absolute and non-absolute values).
First, a paired samples t-test was conducted for the final score when the clip
ended. There was no difference in errors made for the extreme budget team (M = 0.25)
and the average budget team (M = 0), t (133) = .62, p > .05. A second paired samples ttest was conducted for points scored during the clip. There was no difference in errors
made for the extreme budget team (M = -0.48) and the average budget team (M = 0.38), t
(124) = -1.60, p > .05. A third paired samples t-test was conducted for 3-pointers scored
during the clip. There was no difference in errors made for the extreme budget team (M
= 0.92) and the average budget team (M = 0.94), t (132) = -.125, p > .05. A fourth paired
samples t-test was conducted for shooting percentage from the foul line. There was no
difference in errors made for the extreme budget team (M = -1.23) and the average budget
team (M = -1.08), t (129) = -1.62, p > .05. A fifth paired samples t-test was conducted for
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dunks made during the clip. There was no difference in errors made for the extreme
budget team (M = 0.42) and the average budget team (M = 0.34), t (132) = 1.10, p >. 05.
Lastly, a paired samples t-test was conducted for fouls committed during the clip. There
was a significant difference in errors made for the extreme budget team (M = -.28) and
the average budget team (M = -.06), t (133) = -2.16, p = .032. However, this difference
was contrary to the hypothesis. The same analysis was conducted for the player’s photos.
Three players from each team were presented to the participants (with two distracter
photos which were not included in the analysis). A paired samples t-test was conducted
for the participant’s recognition. There was no significant difference in recognition level
of the extreme budget team (M = 1.15) and the average budget team (M = 1.06), t (120) =
0.70, p > .05. Similar analyses were conducted using the absolute values of errors, but
results were no different.

Discussion
The main hypothesis of this study was that people’s attentional focus (as
measured by the accuracy of their memory) would be directed at outliers – either
underdogs that were financially disadvantaged, or top dogs that were highly advantaged.
Such a finding would shed light on the conditions under which underdog support is based
mainly on sympathy for the disadvantaged or, contrary, resentment of the advantaged (i.e.
schadenfreude). This hypothesis was not supported, as there were no clear memory
differences across conditions.
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One of the problems evident from the onset of the study is the low level of interest
the participants had towards the game of basketball and the low enthusiasm they showed
overall towards watching it on TV. This pattern of insignificant results cannot be
explained, however, by inattentiveness to the clip shown to the participants, as their
memory was overall good when the underdog-top dog manipulation was not considered.
Participants were strongly in favor of the underdog across all four conditions regardless
of the departure from the average hypothesis.
Thus, it seems that rooting for the underdog, at least for those who are not avid
fans of the game, does not translate into memory biases but does result in differing
performance attributions for underdogs and top dogs, as demonstrated in a previous study
using a similar manipulation of watching a basketball competition between two unknown
teams (Goldschmied, 2005). This incongruence between the memory for game-related
facts and the attributions made based upon them was also evident in previous research
conducted by Stone, Perry and Darley (1997), who demonstrated that, after being
exposed to an audio broadcast of a basketball game, participants remembered equally
well the statistics of what they presumed to be either a white or a black basketball player,
but when asked to make attributions about his performance, significant differences were
found whereupon participants credited the white player with court smarts while
emphasizing the natural ability of his African-American counterpart.
Overall, the failure to establish conditions in which schadenfreude was evident in
this study might be due to the novelty of the stimulus materials. It is plausible that
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because the current research employed bogus and newly encountered entities with which
the participants were unfamiliar before, schadenfreude never emerged as a motivation.
Previous studies introducing participants to specifically newly created targets did manage
to elicit schadenfreude motivations, but in the majority of the cases the frame of reference
were the participants themselves (i.e., a description of a superb students to a sample of
students; Smith et al., 1996).
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Study 4B: Implications for the Self: The Effects of Underdog Success on the Self
Past research has demonstrated that underdogs are overwhelmingly supported
(e.g., Ceci & Kain, 1982; Frazier & Snyder, 1991; Vandello et al., in press). It is
postulated that the robustness of the phenomenon may be derived from past and present
experiences of ‘me-as-an-underdog’ perception of the self. If the underdog construct is
important to the self, being exposed to a situation where an underdog prevails should
have an impact on various self-relevant aspects such as self-esteem and core beliefs one
holds about the nature of the social world around him/her. It is interesting to note in this
regard that the day in which the American National Olympic Hockey Team surprised the
mighty Russians in what later came to be known as ‘the miracle on ice,’ was the day with
the least reported cases of suicides in the USA between the years of 1972 and 1989
(Joiner, Hollar, & Van Orden, 2006). In the context of the beliefs about the world, two
main theories come to mind: the Protestant Work Ethic (Weber, 1904) and Implicit
Theories of Morality (Chiu, Dweck, Tong & Fu, 1997). While the former focuses on
beliefs about personal freedom and the power of individuals to work autonomously
towards achieving goals, the latter posits that people differ with regards to belief about
whether the world is governed by fixed reality (entity theory) or a malleable one
(incremental theory). Thus, it was hypothesized that those participants who were
exposed to an underdog winning and who initially thought it would do so, would
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temporarily change the way they perceived the social world around them such that they
would experience a marked boost in self-esteem, a stronger belief in hard work as the
basis to bring about transformation, and an overall a greater conviction in the malleability
of the reality around them.
Thus, more specifically, “believers” in the underdog who had their belief
confirmed (i.e., were told that the underdog indeed surprised and prevailed) should have
higher levels of state self-esteem, a stronger belief in the protestant work ethic and a
stronger belief in incremental tendencies (the malleability of the world), above and
beyond of their identification with the underdog. Participants in all other conditions
(believing that the underdog lost and told that it did, believing that underdog lost and told
that it ultimately prevailed and believing that underdog won but told that it eventually
lost) would show markedly lower levels of state self-esteem, belief in the malleability of
the world and the viability of the protestant work ethic. To test this, after having been
exposed to the basketball video clip (Study 4a), which was stopped before the conclusion
of the game when the score was close, participants were told that the underdog either won
or lost the game. The data were analyzed with three separate ANCOVA analyses for
each of the measures, which served as the dependent variables. Assignment of the
participants to an underdog win or loss was one factor while believing (Yes or No) in the
ability of the underdog to triumph was the second. In order to rule out the possibility that
the effects could be simply driven by greater identification with underdogs, the degree to
which participants identified with the underdog was also measured and controlled for.
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Method
Participants. The same 161 participants who participated in Study 4a took part in
Study 4b.
Procedure. The second phase of Study 4 examined how believing in underdogs
and witnessing them prevail could affect the self and beliefs about the social world.
Immediately following the completion of the underdog support questions, participants
were asked to answer a series of questions about their level of identification with the two
teams (Appendix D). The last question asked the participants to predict which team won
the game. Once they had done so, the research assistant entered the room and asked
again which team they thought had won the game. Next, the research assistant informed
them of the final score: Half of the participants were told that the underdog team had won
while the other half were informed that the favorite had eventually prevailed (in a
counter-balanced fashion). The research assistant then showed the participants a short
clip from the supposed crowd celebrations following the game to let the outcome be
absorbed. The participants were then informed that the experiment ended but were
prodded to participate in another, ostensibly unrelated, brief study “since the time
allotment for the original study was not over yet” (the participants were informed on the
online research participation tool that the study would last 30 minutes, while it usually
took no longer than 20 minutes). The participants then read and signed another bogus
informed consent form for an ostensibly separate study and completed three
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questionnaires measuring their state self-esteem, implicit theories about the world
(incremental versus entity) and Protestant work ethic.
The first scale of state self-esteem (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) was a 20-item
state inventory measuring how one felt at the time of taking the test after underdog
success or failure. The State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES) has 3 correlated factors:
performance, social, and appearance self-esteem and had proven to be sensitive to
laboratory manipulations and psychometrically sound in measuring clinical changes in
self-esteem.
The Protestant Ethic Scale of Quinn and Crocker (1999), a 16-item scale with a
reliability coefficient of .79 (see Appendix D), was also used.
Lastly, the 9-item scale of Implicit Theories of Morality by Chiu, Dweck, Tong
and Fu (1997) assessed entity (fixed reality) vs. incremental (mutability) tendencies. In
this unidimensional questionnaire, agreement with items reflected a greater endorsement
of an entity worldview, and disagreement reflected endorsement of an incremental
worldview. Three main domains covered by this measure are world, morality and
intelligence. The test-retest reliability for a 2-week interval was .80 (Dweck et al., 1995;
Appendix D).

Results
First, it was explored whether participants identified with the underdog or the topdog. Three questions measuring identification (i.e., How much do you identify with Tau/
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Panathinaikos? How much do you see yourself in Tau/ Panathinaikos? and How similar
are you to Tau/ Panathinaikos?) were aggregated ( = .92) to form an overall
identification measure. Participants identified significantly more with the underdog (M =
14.87, SD = 6.59) than with the top-dog (M = 11.79, SD = 5.65), t (134) = 4.73, p < .001.
There was no significant difference between the identification participants felt towards
Panathinaikos – the Greek team (M = 12.96, SD = 6.45) vs. Tau – the Spanish team (M =
13.7, SD = 6.19), t (134) = 1.04, p > .05.
Next, the three self-report measures were assessed. All three scales exhibited
high internal consistency:
Work Ethic Scale; and

= .90 for the state self-esteem scale;

= .78 for the Protestant

= .82 for the Implicit Theories of Morality scale.

A two-way between-groups analysis of covariance was conducted to assess the
influence of believing in the ability of the underdog to win and being informed that it did
on attitude formation of the social world as well as about the self. The independent
variables were whether the participant thought the underdog prevailed in the game
(Yes/No) and whether they were told that it did (Yes/No). The dependent variables, which
were analyzed separately, were State Self-Esteem, Protestant Work Ethic, and Implicit
Theories of Morality. Scores on identification with the underdog were used as a
covariate to control for individual differences.
Preliminary checks were conducted to ensure that there was no violation of the
assumptions of normality, linearity, homogeneity of variances, homogeneity of regression
slopes, and reliable measurement of the covariate. After adjusting for identification with
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the underdog, there was no interaction effect on state self-esteem [F (1, 129) = .04, p >
.05]. Neither was there an interaction effect on the belief in Protestant Work Ethic [F (1,
128) = .76, p > .05]. Lastly, there was no significant interaction effect on Implicit
Theories of Morality [F (1, 128) = .03, p > .05]. None of these analyses revealed any
significant main effects.
These results suggest that people’s beliefs regarding who will prevail, as well as
being told which side won the competition, exerted no influence over their perceptions of
the social world around them as well as how they felt about themselves.
The main finding of interest emerging from this study was the strong
identification participants felt towards the underdog team. People had very little
reservations to note that they saw themselves in the underdog team and that they felt
similar to it. In addition, people who identified more strongly with underdogs also
supported them more than people who identified less, r = 0.59, p < .05. Of note, 78
participants predicted an underdog win while only 56 thought the top-dog would prevail,
despite the score being within 1 point at the end of the clip.

Discussion
Participants did not modify their self-perceptions and their beliefs about the
nature of the world around them based on their feelings and the underdog faith.
However, they felt strong identification with it.
As most people live average lives, it seems that when competing in various
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capacities, people should experience themselves both as underdogs and top-dogs
throughout their lives. However, for some reason, it seems that participants cherish their
moments as an underdog more so than when they were top-dogs. An alternative
perspective would argue that almost all people are underdogs and that there are very few
top-dogs out there in the world (e.g., the Donald Trumps of the world), or regardless of
people’s own status or stature, they are always aware of the possibility of a more
powerful entity that could supplant their autonomy and control, and as such the “me as an
underdog” is a much more common experience than being a top-dog.
Identification in the present context can be defined as the orientation of the self
such that individuals define themselves in terms of their group membership (cf. Kelman,
1961). The degree to which an affiliation affects self-definition is defined by the strength
of the individual’s group identification. Stronger identification leads the individual to
attribute desirable characteristics of the group to the self, and to assume a greater
similarity with other group members (Stotland, Zander, & Natsoulas, 1961). Some prior
research in psychology went as far as measuring identification as the perceived similarity
between the individual and the identification target (e.g., Dignan, 1965). To the extent
that one is connected to groups that are favorably evaluated, one’s social identity is
positive. Accordingly, individuals emphasize the distinctive and positive aspects of
group membership as a way of managing their self-image. The present results indicate
that, despite the strong identification the participants felt towards the underdog, they
failed to experience any changes on how they felt about themselves or the world around
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them after an underdog defeat or success. This stands in contrast to previous research
suggesting that individuals experience vicariously the successes and failures of the group
they identify with (Kagan, 1958). It seems that the participants in the present study took
more of a cognitive stand towards the underdog team than an emotional one. In other
words, people might like underdogs because of what they stand for. Possibly, for the
participants to care about them, they should be also interested in the context in which the
underdog operates.
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General Discussion
Overall, the results of the current study indicate that people in our society believe
that underdogs are unique exemplars which are expected to do significantly better than
the initial expectations.
Past research on disadvantaged competitors found that they were significantly
supported in comparison to their much mightier opponents (Kim et al., unpublished
manuscript; Frazier & Snyder, 1991; Vandello et al., in press). As a result, it was
concluded that unaffiliated observers demonstrated “underdog support” tendencies.
However, previous studies of this phenomenon almost exclusively used the methodology
of describing a situation of disadvantage (based on either the expectations to prevail or
lack of resources) of a previously unknown contender and then querying the participants
about their support tendencies, without directly labeling the weaker side as the
“underdog.” Thus, one of the main aims of the current research was to explore the
underdog label itself and to determine what concepts were directly associated with it in
memory. The main finding was that the underdog construct was linked both to
disadvantage (in congruence with the dictionary definition) but also to success. This
duality, it is argued, emanates from the “looming success” component of being branded
as an underdog. While present conditions of being an underdog may signal a state of
inferiority, the future looms large in terms of overcoming the initial disadvantage.
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The looming success component was then studied in a direct fashion in which a
struggling entity facing stiff competition was labeled either as an “underdog” or
“disadvantaged” in a bogus newspaper article. The results of such direct investigation
showed that participants attributed higher success rates, above and beyond expert’s
predictions, for both “underdog” and “disadvantaged” competitors, but their level of
optimism for the former far exceeded that of the latter.
The rosy expectations for underdogs could be the prime reason why athletes and
politicians aggressively pursue the designation of an underdog even if, at times, they have
to tweak the reality for their audiences and supporters as, for example, in the case of
Barak Obama who has matched his financial resources with Hillary Clinton, the
undisputed top-dog in the Democratic party for election 2008, but, nevertheless, willingly
declared: “When your name is Barack Obama, you’re always an underdog in political
races. That’s how it was when I ran for the United States Senate.” (Associated Press
[AP], 2007).
This psychological mechanism of the looming success component might be
driven by the extensive media exposure of the exemplar underdogs from the past (who
happened to prevail) whenever a new underdog emerges, including fictional underdog
depictions in books and in popular films. While the current attempt to demonstrate this
process received mixed support in Study 3, perhaps extending the time duration between
acquisition and recognition in the false paradigm in future studies would allow for the
proposed schematic distortions to develop (as well as overload participants with more
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information to increase the false recognition rates).
Additionally, self-identification with the underdog emerged as a strong correlate
with the support extended to it. Based on the results of Study 4, people seemed to easily
see themselves in a struggling entity and wish for it to succeed. This identification was
remarkable given that the underdogs depicted in the study were not individuals but a
collective or a team. Yet, review of the underdog literature suggests that this finding is
robust and even participants watching two animated rolling geometric figures climbing a
hill reported identification with the one which slowed down and had a much harder time
going up (i.e., the underdog) than with its non-affected counterpart (Kim et al.,
unpublished manuscript). Thus, it seems that the identification is not grounded in the
competing entities per se, but in the perceived differences between the underdog and the
top-dog.
In regards to the impact of underdogs on the self, the current study failed to
establish temporary change in the self and perceptions of the social world around those
experiencing an underdog triumphing. It is possible, however, that the changes should be
explored in other behavioral domains, including implicit priming. For example,
potentially, an exposure to an underdog may motivate people to continue and work longer
on a difficult/impossible task. Perhaps also for underdogs to impact the self, the scenarios
must be more emotionally engaging than the stimulus material used in Study 4.
Future studies might usefully address subtle differences between the domains in
which underdogs operate and struggle to overcome the competition (i.e., politics, sports
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and business). In politics, for example, the current finding of ‘looming success’ was not
accompanied by significant support for the underdog. Other studies in this realm found
some support for the “bandwagon” effect, which refers to an increased tendency to
support the candidate who is, in fact, leading and gaining in the polls, rather than to a
trailing contender (McAllister & Studler, 1991; Simon, 1954). This change of the tide
might be associated with self-interest (Kim et al., unpublished manuscript), as people
potentially perceive a domain like politics as an important avenue to influence their
quality of life and the future in the broader context. Hence, however remote the
underdog vignette they are being exposed to from their present situation as voters, they
fail to exhibit the underdog effect because they feel it is important to support the “better”
candidate. In other words, they might be guided by the notion that if support for the
leading candidate is strong, then he/she is superior to the underdog and, thus, is the better
choice overall. In contrast, the sports domain is devoid of far reaching implications of
the competition resolution (i.e., win or loss) and, in this setting, people seem to
conclusively support underdogs (Frazier & Snyder, 1991; Kim et al, unpublished
manuscript; Vandello et al., in press). In this respect, in the present investigation of the
semantic meaning of underdog (Study 1), it was found to be mostly linked to the sports
field, given that the sport emerged as the only semantic category with specific, domainrelated associates that were included in the associative map (i.e., football), while neither
politics nor business terms were mentioned as associates.
It is possible that, when it comes to perceptions about underdog entities, domain
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specificity is dependent on how the underdog/top-dog alignment is determined initially
across domains. Specifically, buyers in the business realm or voters in the political arena
determine the strength of each competitor by either their purchasing behavior or voting
tendencies, respectively, while in sports betting may be an index of relative strength but
the wagers are not the reason why a contender is expected to do well or not, but rather a
reflection of its relative strength. Thus, the boundary conditions of the underdog effect in
the various domains should be delineated and explored further.
A different avenue for future exploration may focus on underdog support as a
behavior which is intended to make the individual distinct from others and thus satisfy
the need for uniqueness (Snyder & Fromkin, 1977). This human motivation seems to be
a welcome guest when information on how most people behave or think is readily
available. The end result of supporting the underdog may be similar to that which is
proposed by the utilitarian approach but the impetus is clearly different. Thus, rather than
self-shielding from an aversive emotional state (as a utilitarian approach would suggest),
an underdog supporter may seek to differentiate himself or herself from the majority of
the people and is therefore willing to risk the high emotional stakes just to be able to
stand alone from the crowd.
Lastly, only anecdotal evidence is available regarding how robust the underdog
effect is across cultures. Based on the ubiquity of the underdog story in religion and
mythology it seems plausible to assume that it is evident across different national, racial
and ethnical divides. However, no exploration into this realm has been conducted. It is
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possible that some variants of underdog support exist cross-culturally, such as a proposal
made by an Australian sociologist (“The Underdog”) that in his country the underdog
need not to prevail as what matters to ensure the support of the people is the attitude of
taking on the powerful establishment. As a result, failing is perfectly acceptable and even
admirable. This notion is in direct contrast to the underdog entities depicted for example
in the American folklore.
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Appendix A: Study 1 Materials
I.

General instructions for participants

95

II.

Testing Page

96
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INSTRUCTIONS

I would like you to help me find out what words people commonly think of as
being associated with certain words. In the coming page, you will see words, each of
which has a blank next to it. Your task will be to write in each blank the first word you
think of that means the same thing as or is strongly associated with the word printed on
the page. It does not matter what word you write. However, please do not use names of
people, places, teams or movies. There are no right or wrong answers. For example, if
the word were “ARM” you might write “LEG”. If the word were “DOG” you might
write “CAT” or “PUPPY”. The proper way of indicating the word is:

ARM

LEG

DOG

PUPPY

Be sure to print your words as clearly as possible, and do not worry if you aren’t sure
how to spell a word. Spell it as best you can. Work as fast as possible, and be sure to
write only a single word in each blank.
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UNDERDOG

____________________

DOUBT

____________________

FEATHERS

____________________

TOW

____________________

PARKING

____________________

ELECTRIC

____________________
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Appendix B: Study 2 Materials
I.

General instructions for vignettes

II.

Sports Domain Vignettes and questionnaire

III.

IV.
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a. Unequal competition, ‘disadvantage’ word in the text

99

b. Unequal competition, ‘underdog’ word in the text

100

c. Sports Questionnaire
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Politics Domain Vignettes and questionnaire
a. Unequal competition, ‘disadvantage’ word in the text

102

b. Unequal competition, ‘underdog’ word in the text

103

c. Politics Questionnaire
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Business Domain Vignettes and questionnaire
a. Unequal competition, ‘disadvantage’ word in the text
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b. Unequal competition, ‘underdog’ word in the text

106

c. Business Questionnaire
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97

Survey of Public Opinion

This questionnaire explores people’s attitudes and beliefs about the social world
surrounding us. On the following pages, you will read a short article. You will be asked
a number of questions pertaining to its content and your feelings about it. There are no
right or wrong answers here; we are simply interested in people’s opinions. Feel free to
read the article as many times as you wish when answering the questions.

Please turn the page to begin the questionnaire.
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Opinions Questionnaire
Please Circle your gender:

F

M

Based on the short article, which you read just now, we are interested in
your opinions. There are no right or wrong answers. Please circle the most
correct answer in your opinion.
1. How likely do you think are the Melbourne Dragons to win this
game?
[0 –100% range]
_____ %

2. How much do you support them?
Not at all

Somewhat against

Split

Somewhat support

Support fully

3. Do you think the Melbourne Dragons are a disadvantaged team?
No

I don’t know

Yes

4. Would you consider them an underdog?
No

I don’t know

Yes
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102
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Opinions Questionnaire
Please Circle your gender:

F

M

Based on the short article, which you read just now, we are interested in
your opinions. There are no right or wrong answers. Please circle the most
correct answer in your opinion.
1. How likely do you think is John Melbourne to win this elections?
[0 –100% range]
_____ %

2. How much do you support John Melbourne?
Not at all

Somewhat against

Split

Somewhat support

Support fully

3. Do you think John Melbourne is the disadvantaged candidate?
No

I don’t know

Yes

4. Would you consider him the underdog?
No

I don’t know

Yes
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Opinions Questionnaire
Please Circle your gender:

F

M

Based on the short article, which you read just now, we are interested in
your opinions. There are no right or wrong answers. Please circle the most
correct answer in your opinion.
1. How likely do you think is the Grand Heaven Inc. to win the tender?
[0 –100% range]
_____ %
2. How much do you support Grand Heaven Inc.?
1

2

3

4

Not at
all

5

6

7

8

Mildly

9
Very
much

3. How much do you support The Perth firm?
1

2

3

4

Not at
all

5

6

7

Mildly

8

9
Very
much

4. Do you think that Grand Heaven Inc. is the disadvantaged side?
No

I don’t know

Yes

5. Would you consider Grand Heaven Inc. the underdog?
No

I don’t know

Yes

107

Appendix C: Study 3 Materials
I.

General instructions for the task (1st screen)

II.

Sports Vignettes (2nd screen)
a.

Before the competition

109

110

b. After the competition, a surprise win

111

c. After the competition, a predicted lose

112

III.

Distracter Task (3rd screen)

113

IV.

Instructions before practice recognition task (5th screen)

115

V.

Instructions before ‘underdog’ recognition task

116

VI.

Stimuli for ‘underdog’ recognition task

117

VII.

Confidence Ranking question

118

VIII.

Manipulation Check question

119
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Welcome to the Experiment on Reading
Comprehension & Spatial ability.
You are about to be presented with two
short paragraphs.
Read them thoroughly as you will be asked
questions about them later.
Once you are done reading, let the research
assistant know.
To begin reading the paragraph hit the
space bar.
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In NCAA women’s softball national champions
are crowned through a tournament among the
sixteen top-ranked teams in the country.
Since the present seeding system began, No. 16
seeds have never beaten No. 1 seeds in 88
games. However, there is an obvious difference
this year. The 16th ranked ladies of American
State University, who barely made it to the
National tournament, believe they can beat the
almighty Lady Hurricanes of Montana Southern
who are ranked No. 1. Bill Dulles, the head
coach for the lowest ranked American State
team said before the game: “We struggled
mightily to be were we are now at but we can
surprise any team even last year’s reigning
champions, Montana Southern. Surprise wins
are the essence of the tournament!”
In recent years, the national softball tournament
has become big business with annual revenues
reaching the 10 million mark, all games being
broadcasted on TV and teams vying for big-time
exposure.
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In NCAA women’s softball national champions
are crowned through a tournament among the
sixteen top-ranked teams in the country.
Since the present seeding system began, No. 16
seeds have never beaten number 1 seeds in 88
games.
However, there was an obvious difference this
year. Bill Dulles, the head coach for the lowest
ranked American State team said before the
game: “We struggled mightily to be were we are
now at but we can surprise any team even last
year’s reigning champions, Montana Southern.
Surprise wins are the essence of the
tournament!” The 16th ranked ladies of
American State University, who barely made it
to the National tournament, did beat eventually
the almighty Lady Hurricanes of Montana
Southern who were ranked No. 1.
In recent years, the national softball tournament
has become big business with annual revenues
reaching the 10 million mark, all games being
broadcasted on TV and teams vying for big-time
exposure.
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In NCAA women’s softball national champions
are crowned through a tournament among the
sixteen top-ranked teams in the country.
Since the present seeding system began, No. 16
seeds have never beaten number 1 seeds in 88
games. This year was no different. The 16th
ranked, ladies of American State University, who
barely made it to the National tournament,
believed that they could beat the almighty Lady
Hurricanes of Montana Southern ranked No. 1.
Bill Dulles, the head coach for the lowest ranked
American State team said before the game: “We
struggled mightily to be were we are now at but
we can surprise any team even last year’s
reigning champions, Montana Southern.
Surprise wins are the essence of the
tournament!” However, his team ultimately lost
the game.
In recent years, the national softball tournament
has become big business with annual revenues
reaching the 10 million mark, all games being
broadcasted on TV and teams vying for big-time
exposure.
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A sweltering heat wave gripped most of the
nation today, with high temperatures in the 90’s
expected in nearly every state, and 100-degree
heat predicted in many places in the Northeast
and southern Plains states.
Excessive-heat warnings were issued by the
National Weather Service for eastern
Pennsylvania, most of New Jersey and the St.
Louis area. Because of high humidity, the
weather there will feel much hotter than the
thermometer reading, the Weather Service said.
For example, 60 percent humidity makes 90degree weather feel like 100 degrees.
The agency advised people to stay indoors as
much as possible and drink nonalcoholic fluids to
avoid dehydration.
Heat is the single largest natural killer of
Americans in the continental United States,
causing the death of 175 people in an average
year, the agency said — more than lightning,
hurricanes, tornadoes, floods or earthquakes.
The Weather Service warned in particular
against keeping children or pets in cars, even for
a short time.
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“Temperatures in a car with windows up can
reach over 150 degrees, quickly resulting in heat
stroke and death,” the service said.
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On the next screen, you will be shown
graphic symbols. Learn them carefully.
After you study the symbols, you will be
asked to recognize if the symbols appeared
or not on the previous screen.
Hit the 'L' key if you think the symbol did
show up.
Hit the 'A' key if you think the symbol did
not show up.
Place your 'pointer' fingers on the keys.
A Brief '+' sign will show up before each
symbol.
Try to be as accurate and fast as possible.
When you are ready, hit the space bar.
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Now recall the "NCAA Championship"
paragraph that you read to begin the
experiment. Next, you will be shown words
on the screen. Some words appeared in
the paragraph and some did not.
Hit the 'L' key if you think the word did
show up.
Hit the 'A' key if you think the word did not
show up.
Place your 'pointer' fingers on the keys.
A Brief '+' sign will show up before each
symbol.
Try to be as accurate and fast as possible.
Hit the space bar when ready.
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tournament
basketball
underdog
softball
expectations
beat
almighty
strong
emotional
hope
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Please state how sure were you in regards to
the word: underdog
1234-

Not sure at all
Somewhat confident
Confident
Very confident
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Who won the game eventually?
1-the 16th ranked team
2-the 1st ranked team
3-the game was not played yet
4-do not remember
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Appendix D: Study 4 Materials
I.

Sports Vignettes, prior to watching the basketball clip
a.

II.

Tau – schadenfruede eliciting vignette

121

b. Panathinaikos – schadenfruede eliciting vignette
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c. Tau – underdog support eliciting vignette
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d. Panathinaikos – underdog support eliciting vignette
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Memory Questionnaire for vignette

125

a.

126

Memory Questionnaire for clip – Tau

b. Memory Questionnaire for clip – Panathinaikos
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III.

Support and Identification Questionnaire

128

IV.

State Self-Esteem Questionnaire
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V.

Protestant Ethic Questionnaire

132

VI.

Implicit Theories of Morality Scale
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You are about to watch two of the best basketball teams in Europe fighting
on the last remaining spot in the prestigious European cup semi-finals.
Tau from Spain has always dominated Panathinaikos from Greece and the
two teams experience strong animosity towards each other. Betting on the
final score show that 90% of the money is placed on Tau to win the game
handily.
Tau has been the most successful club in Europe winning the cup 3 times
consecutively and is enjoying an overwhelming $107 million payroll, which
is almost 5 times more than the average of $21 million and easily qualifies it
as the richest club in the continent. In contrast, Panathinakos, the underdog,
has a mere $22 million payroll.
We would like to test your ‘basketball’ analysis and predictions skills to
guess the final score based on the data provided here and a short clip of the
final stages of the game itself. Are there any questions before we begin?
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You are about to watch two of the best basketball teams in Europe fighting
on the last remaining spot in the prestigious European cup semi-finals.
Panathinaikos from Greece has always dominated Tau from Spain and the
two teams experience strong animosity towards each other. Betting on the
final score show that 90% of the money is placed on Panathinaikos to win
the game handily.
Panathinaikos has been the most successful club in Europe winning the cup
3 times consecutively and is enjoying an overwhelming $107 million
payroll, which is 5 times more than the average of $21 million and easily
qualifies it as the richest club in the continent. In contrast, Tau, the
underdog, has a mere $22 million payroll.

We would like to test your ‘basketball’ analysis and predictions skills to
guess the final score based on the data provided here and a short clip of the
final stages of the game itself. Are there any questions before we begin?
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You are about to watch two of the best basketball teams in Europe fighting
on the last remaining spot in the prestigious European cup semi-finals.
Panathinaikos from Greece has always dominated Tau from Spain and the
two teams experience strong animosity towards each other. Betting on the
final score show that 90% of the money is placed on Panathinaikos to win
the game handily.
Tau, the underdog, has failed repeatedly to make the semi-finals in recent
years and has a meager $5 million payroll in comparison to an average
payroll of $21 million of teams taking part in the cup. This budget qualifies
it as the poorest club in Europe. Panathinaikos, in contrast, has a payroll of
$22 million.
We would like to test your ‘basketball’ analysis and predictions skills to
guess the final score based on the data provided here and a short clip of the
final stages of the game itself. Are there any questions before we begin?
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You are about to watch two of the best basketball teams in Europe fighting
on the last remaining spot in the prestigious European cup semi-finals.
Tau from Spain has always dominated Panathinaikos from Greece and the
two teams experience strong animosity towards each other. Betting on the
final score show that 90% of the money is placed on Panathinaikos to win
the game handily.
Panathinaikos, the underdog, has failed repeatedly to make the semi-finals in
recent years and has a meager $5 million payroll in comparison to an
average payroll of $21 million of teams taking part in the cup. This budget
qualifies it as the poorest club in Europe. Tau, in contrast, has a payroll of
$22 million.

We would like to test your ‘basketball’ analysis and predictions skills to
guess the final score based on the data provided here and a short clip of the
final stages of the game itself. Are there any questions before we begin?
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Memory Questionnaire
Did you recognize any of the players from past games? If so, who?

Who is the underdog team (please circle)?
Panathinaikos

Tau

Which country does Tau represent?
________________
Which country does Panathinaikos represent?
________________
What color of uniform did Tau wear?
________________
What color of uniform did Panathinaikos wear?
________________
What is Tau’s payroll?
________________
What is Panathinaikos’ payroll?
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Neither

________________
What is the average budget in Europe?
________________
In the clip you have just watched (if you don’t recall exactly, give us your
best estimation):

1. When the clip ended, how many points did Tau have?
_______

2. How many points did Tau score during the clip you just watched?
_______

3. How many 3 points shots did Tau make?
0

1

2

3

4

5 or more

4. What was Tau’s shooting percentage from the foul line?
50% or less

60%

70%

80%

90% and up

5. How many times did Tau dunk the ball?
0

1

2

3 or more

6. How many fouls did Tau commit?
0

1

2

3
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4

5 or more

In the clip you have just watched (if you don’t recall exactly, give us your
best estimation):

1. When the clip ended, how many points did Panathinkaikos have?
_______

2. How many points did Panathinkaikos score during the clip you just watched?
______

3. How many 3 points shots did Panathinkaikos make?
0

1

2

3

4

5 or more

4. What was Panathinkaikos shooting percentage from the foul line?
50% or less

60%

70%

80%

90% and up

5. How many times did Panathinkaikos dunk the ball?
0

1

2

3 or more

6. How many fouls did Panathinkaikos commit?
0

1

2

3
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4

5 or more

Please answer the following questions:
1. How much would you like Tau to win the game?
1

2

3

4

Not at
all

5

6

7

8

Mildly

9
Very
much

2. How much would you like Panathinaikus to win the game?
1

2

3

4

Not at
all

5

6

7

8

Mildly

9
Very
much

3. How much can you identify with Tau?
1

2

3

4

Not at
all

5

6

7

8

Mildly

9
Very
much

4. How much can you identify with Panathinaikus?
1

2

3

4

Not at
all

5

6

7

8

Mildly

9
Very
much

5. How much do you see yourself in team Tau?
1

2

3

4

Not at
all

5

6

7

8

Mildly

9
Very
much

6. How much do you see yourself in team Panathinaikus?
1
Not at
all

2

3

4

5

6

Mildly
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7

8

9
Very
much

7. How similar do you feel to team Tau?
1

2

3

4

Not at
all

5

6

7

8

Mildly

9
Very
much

8. How similar do you feel to team Panathinaikus?
1

2

Not at
all

3

4

5

6

7

8

Mildly

9
Very
much

9. As a first impression, which team do you like better (circle one)?
Tau

Panathinaikus

10. Not knowing anything else about the teams, which team would you probably
root for (circle one)?
Tau

Panathinaikus

11. Which team, if any, is the “underdog”? Why?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

12. Based on the clip you just watched, which team do you think won the
game?
Tau

Panathinaikus
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Current Thoughts
INSTRUCTIONS:
This is a questionnaire designed to measure what you are thinking at this moment. There
is, of course, no right answer for any statement. The best answer is what you feel is true
of yourself at this moment. Be sure to answer all of the items, even if you are not certain
of the best answer. Again, answer these questions as they are true for you RIGHT NOW.
1
Not at all

2
A little bit

3
Somewhat

4
Very much

5
Extremely

1.

I feel confident about my abilities.

_____

2.

I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure.

_____

3.

I feel satisfied with the way my body looks right now.

_____

4.

I feel frustrated or rattled about my performance.

_____

5.

I feel that I am having trouble understanding things that I read.

_____

6.

I feel that others respect and admire me.

_____

7.

I am dissatisfied with my weight.

_____

8.

I feel self-conscious.

_____

9.

I feel as smart as others.

_____

10.

I feel displeased with myself.

_____

11.

I feel good about myself.

_____

12.

I am please with my appearance right now.

_____

13.

I am worried about what other people think about me.

_____

14.

I feel confident that I understand things.

_____

15.

I feel inferior to others at this moment.
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_____

16.

I feel unattractive.

_____

17.

I feel concerned about the impression I am making.

_____

18.

I feel that I have less scholastic ability right now than others.

_____

19.

I feel like I’m not doing well.

_____

20.

I am worried about not looking foolish.

____
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Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the statements
below using the following scale:
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Agree
somewhat

Disagree
somewhat

Disagree

Very strongly
disagree

___1. Most people spend too much time in unprofitable amusements.
___2. Our society would have fewer problems if people had less leisure time.
___3. Money acquired easily is usually spent unwisely.
___4. Most people who don’t succeed in life are just plain lazy.
___5. Anyone who is willing and able to work hard has a good chance of succeeding.
___6. People who fail at a job have usually not tried hard enough.
___7. Life would have very little meaning if we never had to suffer.
___8. The person who can approach an unpleasant task with enthusiasm is the person
who gets ahead.
___9. If people work hard enough they are likely to make a good life for themselves.
___10. I feel uneasy when there is little work for me to do.
___11. A distaste for hard work usually reflects a weakness of character.
___12. Getting ahead is a matter of working hard and relying only on yourself.
___13. People are responsible for their own situation in life.
___14. People should not count on others to solve their problems for them.
___15. A person who blames others for his or her problems is a cop-out.
___16. If you want to be successful, all you have to do is work hard and improve
yourself.
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Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the statements
below:

1. Though some phenomena can be changed, it is unlikely that the core dispositions
of the world can be altered.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Agree
somewhat

Disagree
somewhat

Disagree

Very strongly
disagree

2. A person’s moral character is something very basic about them and it can’t be
changed much.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Agree
somewhat

Disagree
somewhat

Disagree

Very strongly
disagree

3. You have a certain amount of intelligence and you can’t do very much to change
it.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Agree
somewhat

Disagree
somewhat

Disagree

Very strongly
disagree

4. Our world has its basic and ingrained dispositions, and you really can’t do much
to change it.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Agree
somewhat

Disagree
somewhat

Disagree

Very strongly
disagree

5. Whether a person is responsible and sincere or not is deeply ingrained in their
personality. It cannot be changed very much.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Agree
somewhat

Disagree
somewhat

Disagree

Very strongly
disagree
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6. Your intelligence is something about you that you can’t change much.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Agree
somewhat

Disagree
somewhat

Disagree

Very strongly
disagree

7. Some societal trends may dominate for a while, but the fundamental nature of our
world is something that cannot be changed much.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Agree
somewhat

Disagree
somewhat

Disagree

Very strongly
disagree

8. There is not much that can be done to change a person’s moral traits (e.g.
conscientiousness, uprightness, honesty).
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Agree
somewhat

Disagree
somewhat

Disagree

Very strongly
disagree

9. You can learn new things, but you can’t really change your basic intelligence.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very strongly
agree

Agree

Agree
somewhat

Disagree
somewhat

Disagree

Very strongly
disagree
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